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Introduction 
Ethnicity is formulated by Horowitz (1985) as a term that designates a sense of collective belonging, 
which could be based on common descent, language, history, culture, race, or religion (or some 
combination of these). Though ethnicity can evidently be instrumental to a sense of collective belonging, 
it has also spurred up conflict and violence in the past. Examples are numerous in history and the present, 
including tribal violence between Hutu’s and Tutsi’s in Rwanda, religious animosity in Ireland, 
persecution of the Jewish population in the Third Reich, and ethnic violence following the secession of 
the former-Yugoslav nations. Political theorists and social researchers have inspired to research ethnicity 
and ethnic groups. Though previous research and literature on ethnicity has entailed the relationship 
between it and nation building, consociational democracy and migration, this research will focus on 
ethnic conflict and relevant literature. 
Paramount in this research’s effort is to better understand ethnicity and its role in society regarding 
conflict and cooperation. According to Kymlicka it is necessary to give ethnic groups certain rights, 
which are group-specific to remedy the disadvantage ethnic groups have against dominant culture. 
Kymlicka defines group-differentiated rights as follows: “…all [are] group-differentiated rights, since 
they are accorded on the basis of cultural membership. But some are accorded to individuals, some to the 
group, some to a province or territory, and some where numbers warrant” (Kymlicka, 1995: 45). These 
rights can entail anything as long as these group-differentiated rights are based on cultural membership 
and are awarded to individuals. They do not necessarily adhere to these individuals, but can also adhere to 
groups or territories. 
In this research the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda will be compared thoroughly, 
focusing on how these two countries developed post-conflict, and what influence the electoral institutions 
had. Both countries suffered from severe ethnic violence, labeled as genocide, that shook up the 
international community. Bosnia harbored three ethnic groups at the time: Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats 
and Bosniaks (Islamic Bosnians). In Bosnia ethnic cleansing occurred on many occasions. Bosniaks, 
Croats and Serbs were expelled from their homes by opposing military forces during the Bosnian war 
from 1992 until 1995. In Srebrenica, a UN declared safe-haven, around 7,000 Bosniaks were murdered by 
Serbians, an act of genocide according to the UN (UN, 2007).  
In Rwanda ethnic violence has been even more extreme than in Bosnia. Rwanda was ethnically divided 
into three groups: Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Extremist Hutu’s in the political elite began blaming the Tutsi 
minority for economic and political unrest, accusing them of supporting a primarily Tutsi rebel group, the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). When the country’s president Habyarimana was murdered, his plane 
was shot down in 1994, an estimated 800,000 people were murdered in months following the crash, in 
what is now known as the Rwandese genocide (UNHRC, 2014). 
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These two countries are interesting for in-depth research due to the contrast between the extreme violence 
of the civil war situation and their post-conflict situations, which gives an opportunity to examine the 
resurrection of these countries. An in-depth analysis will be conducted on the circumstances under which 
the ethnic conflict de-escalated in both countries. Special attention will be paid to the electoral institutions 
and how it influenced political and societal life.  
Research Question 
This research attempts to find satisfying explanation to the question: How do electoral institutions 
influence the de-escalation of ethnic conflict?  
This thesis will elaborate on the debate in political science literature on power-sharing. This debate, as 
further examination will show, concerns ethnically divided societies and the way in which political 
institutions influence the de-escalation of ethnic conflict. The original and main theorist, Lijphart, argues 
that ethnically divided societies function better with power-sharing institutions, which ensures that ethnic 
groups are included in the most important political institutions and acquire representation proportional to 
their size (or in some cases equal representation, regardless of their size). He argues that key element in 
this process is to give ethnic groups autonomy and to shield them from interference in their cultural 
affairs by the central state (Lijphart, 1977; Norris, 2008; Spears, 2010: 10). 
Horowitz applies a different logic, an integrationist logic, to the de-escalation of ethnic conflict. 
Institutions should focus on transcending ethnical differences, and he argues that ethnic parties should be 
avoided at all costs (Horowitz, 1985). He defends majoritarian electoral institutions, as opposed to 
proportional electoral institutions that are prescribed by power-sharing. In this thesis the cases of Rwanda 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which share a re-emergence from a civil war infused with ethnic hatred and 
violence, are examined from the end of civil war until the present day. Two distinct strategies were 
employed to reduce ethnic tensions and to de-escalate the civil conflict. In Bosnia, power-sharing 
institutions were imposed by the international community. In Rwanda, the former Tutsi rebels of the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front won the civil war. They have taken over power and installed a ‘neutral’ 
government. Even though elections are held every six years since 2003, political pluralism has been 
severely limited.  
Clearly the two countries differ greatly in terms of institutional design, and have used different strategies. 
Nevertheless both countries are relatively peaceful today. The main point of this thesis is to discuss 
whether power-sharing institutions and proportional representation (PR) are universally applicable to 
mitigate ethnic conflict in any post-conflict case. Power-sharing advocates influence policy makers and 
infuse them with the idea that power-sharing or PR is the recipe for the termination of war and 
democratization (Dixon, 2011: 313). Empirical evidence is not in any way conclusive whether or not this 
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is the case. Nevertheless, PR seems to be the dominant prescription for the first elections in post-conflict 
peace settlement (Boogaards, 2013: 82).  
While Bosnia is an example of a case where power-sharing has worked well, albeit with considerable 
commitment from the international community, Rwanda is an example where power-sharing was not the 
best option to achieve peace. This is due to the nature of African politics, as I will later explain, but also 
self-evident given the failure of power-sharing institutions to prevent the Rwandan genocide. Given the 
fact that PR is the most prescribed electoral system in post-conflict African peace settlements, and given 
the lack of conclusive empirical evidence for the favourable role of PR in such situations; the policy 
makers should adopt a more case specific and critical view on PR and power-sharing (ibid.), as failing to 
do so can have disastrous consequences. 
A detailed review of Bosnia’s and Rwanda’s political developments will shed light on favourable and 
prominent conditions that influence the success of power-sharing institutions in societies divided by 
ethnic conflict. This research will focus on societies that are recovering from acute and violent intra-state 
ethnic conflict, in other words a civil war. In the second chapter of this thesis, the theoretical part, power-
sharing and integrationism will be reviewed systematically, and the most prominent criticisms included. 
In the third chapter, the methods section, the methodology of the thesis is discussed, including the 
dependent and independent variables, data collection and the reasons for selecting the cases. Chapters 4-7 
will cover the empirical part, a detailed analysis of political conduct and the functioning of the country’s 
institutions. Chapter 8 will discuss the results and chapter 9 will conclude this thesis. 
 
 
1. Literature Review 
This chapter is structured as follows: first a general overview of the scientific literature will be presented, 
then we will examine the two cases more closely and show how they relate to the concepts presented in 
the literature on ethnic conflict. 
Institutional approach 
Varshney identifies four separate “Traditions of explanatory enquiry” in the niche of social research on 
ethnic conflict. The first two approaches, essentialism and instrumentalism, are no longer considered to be 
serious or sufficient explanations for ethnic conflict. According to Essentialists, ethnic conflicts are 
deeply rooted in historical conflicts, while Instrumentalists regard ethnic conflict as originating from the 
prospect of political or economic gains. Instrumentalists do not regard ethnic conflict as inherent to 
human nature and therefore do not regard it as intrinsically valuable for research (Varshney, 2014: 285). 
Research interest has shifted to two other approaches: constructivism and institutionalism. Since the 
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institutional approach fits my own research aspirations best, I will only discuss constructivism when it 
criticized institutional perspectives on the formation and transition of ethnic identities, and review the 
institutional literature more thoroughly (Varshney, 2014: 289).  
The institutional traditions of social enquiry on ethnic conflict entails the notion that institutions matter 
(Horowitz, 1985: 293). That the institutional framework: the type of party system, electoral system and 
other power sharing institutions, federalism for instance, shapes the potential for ethnic conflicts 
considerably (Varshney, 2014: 289). Institutional literature with regard to multi-ethnic societies disagrees 
whether they should adopt majoritarian or consensus-based institutions. The field has been defined by 
Lijphart and Horowitz. The two scholars represent different sides in the debate on the influence of 
political institutions on democratic stability and inter-societal conflict. 
Consociational Theory 
Lijphart famously introduced consociational democracy when he tried to explain in a case study of the 
Dutch democracy before 1967 how a society so divided could have a stable democratic government 
(Lijphart, 1967; 1977: 2). He showed how in some Western European democracies (i.e. Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria) with deeply segmented societies, which made them inherently 
centrifugal, democracy could be “a stable and effective system of government” (Lijphart, 1977: 2). Until 
then political scientists had been very pessimistic about the prospects of stable democratic governments in 
segmented societies (Lijphart, 1977: 3). While consociational democracies permit a certain level of 
autonomy to societal groups comprising a divided society, which can be based on ethnicity, the 
interrelation of the leaders is characterized by cooperation, which transcends the segmental or subcultural 
cleavages at the mass level (Lijphart, 1977: 16). This element of power-sharing that Lijphart introduced, 
has been a major contribution to our common understanding of democratic stability. 
Before the concept of consensus democracy was invented Sir Arthur Lewis researched the collapse of 
West-African democracies. He has proposed a primary and secondary meaning of democracy. The first is 
that those who are affected by a decision should be able to participate in making the decision either 
directly or indirectly. The second is that the will of the majority should prevail. These meanings are 
incompatible, because having a prevailing majority results in excluding a minority from participating in 
the decision (Lewis, 1963; Lijphart, 1999: 31). By alternating government after every election this 
incompatibility is somewhat mitigated, as is common in majoritarian democracies where this problem is 
most evident. If the government is not alternating because the currently governing party is not defeated in 
election, the incompatibility between the two meanings can become problematic. A clear case is Northern 
Ireland politics where the Unionist party representing the Protestant majority won all parliamentary 
elections from 1921 until 1972. In ethnically divided countries this can result in disillusionment within 
the minority group and civil strife, which ultimately happened in Northern Ireland (Lijphart, 1999: 33). 
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Contemporary literature on power-sharing is centred on the notions of state building and constitutional 
engineering. Lijphart attributes normative significance to consociational democracy as a blueprint for 
democracy in the Third World (Lijphart, 1977: 16). In a series of comparative studies Lijphart becomes 
convinced of the special features of consociational democracy that give it prescriptive value, as opposed 
to the ‘Westminster type’ of democracy (Bogaards, 2000: 403). Without a proper institutional and cultural 
tradition as well as inclusionary and cooperative politics it seems highly unlikely that consociational 
democracy will be embraced by a country (Lijphart, 1999: 305-306). Especially countries with little or no 
democratic tradition and ethnically divided societies, such as African states, have a high potential for 
ethnic conflict. Holding early elections in conflict-ridden countries seems to attract populist leaders that 
increase ethnic antagonisms to maximize their popular support (Norris, 2008: 13). 
Norris provides us with a clearly identifiable structure for understanding the relationship between the 
electoral institutions and ethnic conflict regarding the electoral institutions, which will be helpful in 
answering the research question. It starts with the condition that the country in question has a plural 
society and contains distinct ethnic communities. The electoral institutions should be PR with low 
thresholds and ideally have positive action mechanisms for minorities, such as boundary delimination, 
communal rolls and reserved seats (Norris, 2008: 105). PR with large multimember districts is expected 
to lower the formal vote hurdles for parties to seek elected office. Norris: “Consociationalism regards PR 
electoral systems as the simplest, least contentious, and most flexible way to facilitate the election of 
parties representing distinct minority communities”(Norris, 2008: 106). Power-sharing is expected to 
facilitate the election of representatives and parties drawn from ethnic communities and facilitate 
inclusive politics (Norris, 2008: 105; Norris, 2008: 108). 
In plural societies with PR and positive action mechanisms, the elected leaders that are drawn from the 
communities are then expected to be willing to cooperate. In fact, they have strong incentives for 
cooperation, bargaining, and compromise. Potentially political parties can even acquire a position in 
government or develop alliances through political give-and-take consensual politics. Support for 
democracy is strengthened within the communities as minorities are represented and inter-communal trust 
is built at the elite level (Norris, 2008, 107-8). In the long term this process should stabilize deeply 
divided and conflict-ridden societies, eventually reducing even ethnic tension (ibid.). Thereby the 
democracy is consolidated, and PR as well as positive action mechanisms have a positive influence on 
ethnic conflict and democratic stability (For a more detailed description see: Norris, 2008 p. 105). 
Critique on concepts in the Consociational Theory 
Lijphart has been criticized for not clarifying the relationship between the empirical and normative types 
of consociational theory. Most criticism is centred around two typologies that Lijphart makes: the 
empirical theory differentiates between societal and elite cooperation, and gives four distinct types of 
7 
 
democracy: centripetal, depoliticized, consociational, and centrifugal democracy (Lijphart, 1977; 
Bogaards, 2000: 401). Of this typology the centripetal and consociational democracies are the most stable. 
In a centrifugal democracy the instability that emanated from a divided society is not checked by the 
soothing forces of elite cooperation. In a depoliticized democracy with a more homogeneous society elite 
cooperation cannot be justified, therefore the systems loses credibility and legitimacy because of the low 
levels of democratic competition (ibid.).  
The normative twofold typology of majoritarian democracy versus consociational democracy was made 
later on (Lijphart, 1984). In the beginning Lijphart himself was not so self-assured of the normative 
merits of consociational democracy. In his first discussion of the value of a normative type of 
consociational democracy he focusses more on the drawbacks: inefficiency, immobilism, the 
strengthening of cleavages and democratic imperfections (Bogaards, 2000: 402). Later on Lijphart 
become more and more convinced of the normative significance of consociational democracy, but he 
commits a couple of errors. 
First of all, while majoritarian democracy is described in strict terms of its characteristics as its empirical 
counterpart in Lijphart’s earlier work revolves only around the notion of adversial behaviour (Bogaards, 
2000: 404). Whether this constitutes the empirical types centrifugal (the antitype of consociational 
democracy) or centripetal democracy is not clear. Lijphart has adopted the term centrifugal democracy 
from Almond’s typology of political systems, where the system is called Continental political systems. 
The fact that this category incorporates regimes like the French Third and Fourth Republics and the 
German Weimar republic, as well as its juxtaposition, the Anglo-Saxon democracy, makes clear that these 
cannot be equated to the majoritarian democracy (Bogaards, 2000: 405). It may be expected that 
theoretically, if consociational democracy has both normative and empirical validity, its juxtapositions in 
both typologies must overlap to high degree, and not deviate much, as Bogaards has shown (ibid.). 
Second, Dixon argues that the concept of consociational theory has been stretched to make it applicable to 
a wide variety of cases that exhibit ethnonationally divided societies (Dixon, 2011: 309). Originally 
Lijphart has derived the term consociational democracy from observing the deviant Dutch case, where the 
choice was between limited democracy or no democracy at all. Later consociationalism was applied to the 
case of Northern-Ireland and appeared to be a bad fit, until the Good Friday Agreement was signed 
(O’Leary and McGarry, 2005: 34). 
Its favourable factors have been dropped, thereby, if we only consider the four characteristics (grand 
coalition, mutual veto, segmental autonomy and proportional representation), making it less distinct from 
other approaches of conflict management such as integrationist power-sharing (Dixon, 2011: 313). 
Bogaards also shows that consociationalism’s favourable factors have been modified quite often by 
Lijphart to fit an ever increasing amount of cases (Bogaards, 1998: 478). The ambiguity is made clear by 
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Dixon as the four characteristics could serve to integrate as well as to segregate societies (2011: 312). By 
which they mean that a concept as autonomy could imply integration (autonomy in society can lead to 
cooperation in politics) as well as segregation (autonomy leads to less cooperation in politics).   
As Sartori points out, conceptual stretching can be problematic if we aim to extend the boundaries of our 
concept to such an extent that it covers most or all cases, at which point it runs the risk of becoming too 
amorphous and universal (Sartori, 1970: 1034). If a concept is stretched and the observational terms 
increased in order to apply to more cases, then the concept itself must be discussed in more abstract terms, 
so as to describe a wider concept. Remaining within the boundaries of the original concept will result in a 
lack of focus (Sartori, 1970: 1040). Dixon argues that Lijphart and O’Leary and McGarry have made a 
mistake by using a broad definition of consociationalism that incorporates integrationist tendencies as 
well. By employing minimal criteria, the theoretical concept of consociationalism is no longer 
distinguishable from other approaches. It makes it difficult to distinguish “what consociationalism is; 
whether it has been applied to a particular conflict; and, therefore, whether or not consociationalism is a 
successful theory” (Dixon, 2011: 313). 
An important reason why consociational theory must be scrutinized is because it serves as an important 
role model in international peace negotiations. Most important is the prescriptive value in conflict 
resolution that is awarded to PR and power-sharing in general. Dixon describes how consociational 
theorists like Lijphart as well as O’Leary and McGarry were first sceptical about the applicability of the 
theory to the case of Northern-Ireland, but as events turned in favour of consensus and adversial groups 
started to talk, they turned their scepticism around and reappraised Northern-Ireland (Dixon, 2011: 314). 
As Lustick states, consociationalists have a tendency to become ‘evangelists’ or ‘academic entrepreneurs’ 
by building academic support and influence on international state building at the same time (Lustick, 
1997; Dixon, 2011: 313). This depicts a danger: if consociationalism is conceptually stretched and 
applied to cases it is not applicable to, international agencies could install consociational institutions in 
countries to which it may not be appropriate. The case of Iraq after the Second Gulf War is a clear 
example (Dixon, 2011: 315-7). Apparently, consociational democracy or power-sharing institutions are 
not applicable to each and every situation.  
Besides the favourable factors that Lijphart provides there is an ongoing debate on whether power-sharing 
institutions are an effective means of conflict resolution in African countries or not. Spears argues that 
African political leaders, even opposition leader, would rather make no deal at all than making a sub-
optimal deal. Traditionally, African countries are seen as an indivisible territory that can be governed by 
only one power, thereby rejecting the notion of federalism (Spears, 2010: 11-13). This tends to increase 
the state of political bargaining, leading to bargaining that is both more rational and more motivated by 
self-interest. This is even more true for political entities that having just engaged in violent conflict: 
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“disputants almost never want to be together, let alone cooperate or share power on equal terms (Spears, 
2010: 11)”.  
The unwillingness to accept the notion of federalism by African leaders is symptomatic of the generally 
weak institutions in African polities. This makes power-sharing ever more difficult, because it requires a 
great deal of institutions constraints, who without powerful guarantees will fail to manage political 
competition in the long run (Spears, 2010: 11). This is what happened in Rwanda in the mid-1990s. 
Because there were no powerful guarantees to ensure power-sharing in the long run, the ruling party, RPF, 
began to slowly but surely accumulate power, thereby eroding power-sharing. More powerful even was 
the psychological barrier to cooperation in Rwanda. The years of civil war, infusion of the population 
with Hutu extremist propaganda and atrocities of the Rwandan genocide completely eliminated trust 
between Tutsis and Hutus making power-sharing even more difficult to achieve (ibid.). 
Considering these constrains it is very odd that power-sharing and proportional representation have been 
so common in peace settlements in the past decades in Africa (Boogaards, 2013: 78). In a comparative 
study of twelve countries on peace agreements, nearly every single case had adopted PR, most of the time 
as part of a broader package of power sharing institutions. Apparently there seems to be a small section of 
the literature on institution building devoted to the electoral institutions. Bogaards’ comparative study has 
shown that PR, as part of consociational democracy, the electoral institutions rarely manage to implement 
both peace and democracy, even though it has been mentioned by Norris, among others, as the core 
sequential steps of Consociational Theory, that it shall lead to democratic consolidation as well as 
reduced (ethnic) conflict (Bogaards, 2013: 81-2; Norris, 2008: 107). Despite the preference for PR there 
has been little empirical evidence regarding causal mechanism of inclusion as well, making it difficult to 
argue that PR has a positive impact on peace and democracy in the context of post-conflict societies 
(Bogaards, 2013: 75). 
Pippa Norris in her comparative study on democratic development and sustenance has a similar 
conclusion as Lijphart on the value of power sharing institutions in divided societies, where identities are 
based on race, language, region/nationality, and who are emerging from deep rooted conflict. She also 
links democratic performance with economic prosperity, as Lipset did (Norris, 2008: 209-211). There are 
however notable outliers to this proposition: Singapore, an autocratic and economically prosperous 
country, and South Africa, Benin and Mali, democratic and poverty stricken countries (Norris, 2008: 222). 
She disagrees with Lijphart on his argument of constitutional engineering and refuses to reduce prospects 
of democratic stability to institutional requirement, claiming that there is no ‘magic pill’ (Norris, 2008: 
218). The evidence of divided democracies with consensus-based institutions plunging into civil strife, 
terrorism and violence, Lebanon and Israel of instance, and majoritarian plural democracies, such as the 
United States and India, remaining peaceful supports her claim. 
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Critique on segregationist tendency of Consociational Theory 
Contrary to Lijphart’s argument for power-sharing and the consociational democracy, Horowitz argues 
for an institutional framework that promotes the formation of parties that appeal across ethnic groups 
(1985: 291). The formation of ethnic parties he argues, especially in Africa and Asia, tend to create party 
systems that will exacerbate ethnic conflict and deepen and extend existing antagonisms. If ethnic 
loyalties are important, parties tend to organize along ethnic lines, but this means that like other 
organization along societal division, it tends to be ethnically exclusive (Horowitz, 1985: 293). A party 
system with more broadly based and fewer parties, that include and aggregate the votes of multiple ethnic 
groups, does not strengthen the ethnic differences and, therefore, leave societies more stable. Though it is 
true in some cases multipartyism and party systems that were entrenched along ethnic lines have led to 
democracies and societies spiralling out of control, threatening democratic stability and giving rise to 
autocratic regimes, there are also numerous examples where it has increased stability. 
Lijphart assumes that ethnic identities based on different attributes, acquired through socialization in early 
childhood and participation in a local community, do not alter in the short term as a result of political 
processes (Norris, 2008: 108). Constructivists challenge this primordial view of ethnicity, arguing that 
these are socially constructed and fluid over time, allowing the possibility for multiple group-membership 
and multiple ethnic identities. (Norris, 2008: 109). Ethnicity is not a rigid classification of the population 
as ethnicity is often linked to political and economic context or social or political narration (Schralm, 
2014: 627). Horowitz states that ethnicity is often closely linked to kinship, especially in African societies 
(1985: 61-70). It often has ascriptive qualities, which are intense and permeative: ethnicity determines an 
individual’s profession, affiliation and attributes (Horowitz, 1985: 53-54). But identity, even seemingly 
rigid identities such as race, can change over the course of years; and small changes can happen much 
faster (Horowitz, 1985: 70). 
Norris is also argued that proportional representation and other power-sharing institutions can threaten 
democratization when political leaders exploit ethnic cleavages in order to gain more electoral support or 
refuse to compromise with other ethnic group leaders. This is what happened, for instance, in Rwanda in 
the years before the genocide. Hutu extremists demonized Tutsis and orchestrated a genocide, after 
power-sharing institutions implemented by the Arusha Accord posed a threat to their survival. It was, by 
all means, a rational consideration (Spears, 2010: 27). Proportional representation has definitely the 
heighten and reinforce political instability when politicians conduct polarizing politics (Norris, 2008: 110; 
Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 41). In general political cooperation will be more difficult with power-sharing 
institutions, because political cooperation de facto entails trade-offs between conflicting sets of values 
(Norris, 2004). 
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As Horowitz justly notes there is no “iron law” concerning the conundrum of favourable institutional 
conditions for democratic stability (1985: 295). We can however safely argue that the ability to politically 
participate is a favourable factor for harmonious coexistence between ethnic groups (Birnir, 1997). Also, 
the willingness of elites to cooperate and transcend ethnic antagonisms can attribute to a stable democracy, 
as well as a positive attitude towards the possibility of stable and inclusive democracy (Lijphart, 1977: 3; 
Lijphart, 1977: 16). 
Descriptive representation 
Closely related to the empirical debate on the best institutional arrangements for stable democracy for 
ethnically divided societies, there is a normative debate on the appointment of group-specific rights.  
Descriptive representation, a concept invented by Hanna Pitkin, is one of several ways in which political 
theorist can view representation. The concept is closely linked to the inclusive political institutions 
proposed by Arend Lijphart. Explaining the concept of descriptive representation will not only give a 
theoretical argument for Lijphart’s preference for proportional representation electoral institutions, which 
should favour the election of political leaders drawn from the prominent societal groups. They will also 
help to explain the choice for groups rights and positive action mechanisms in consociational democracy. 
Descriptive representation is the notion that a representative is “standing for” those he represents by 
“virtue of a correspondence or connection between them (Pitkin, 1967: 61)”. This relationship between 
representative and “the people” goes much further of the formalistic version of representation, where 
representatives act constituents. Descriptive representation is often defended by proponents of 
proportional representation, because it supports the idea that a representative body should be a small 
replica of society, a sort of microcosm of society. Proportional representation, amongst other rules of 
election, ideally delivers on descriptive representation, promoting the idea that all members of society are 
represented by someone akin to themselves (Pitkin, 1967: 62). Two consideration then have to be made 
for multi-ethnic societies: what characteristics are relevant as these change from time to time, and that a 
perfect reflection of society is unattainable (Pitkin, 1967: 87-88). 
Mansbridge thinks of descriptive representation as an effective means to represent disadvantaged groups; 
individuals from the same background are more likely to mirror their “outward manifestation” (1999: 
628). She recognizes that descriptive representation may not necessarily represent the substantive 
interests of their constituents better (Mansbridge, 1999: 630). Descriptive representation entails that most 
likely lesser talent is elected, runs the risk of judging all group members the same and potentially erodes 
the ties of unity in the polity (Mansbridge, 1999; Horowitz, 1985). Selection does mean that 
disadvantaged groups will be better represented, if the groups can be identified and there arrangements 
are temporary in nature (Mansbridge, 1999: 652). Kymlicka is against descriptive representation (1995: 
139). In the next section his take on how disadvantaged groups should be aided institutionally is reviewed.   
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Group-differentiated rights and positive action mechanisms 
Power-sharing institutions can employ different measures to achieve minority representation and prevent 
the disadvantagement of societal groups. Descriptive representation is one take on this problem, although 
it has a fair amount of costs linked to it, it can prove beneficial in the short run. Kymlicka (1995) offers a 
contribution to the normative debate on what keeps ethnically divides societies harmonious. He 
challenges the believe that the neutral liberal state offers a level playing field, especially in countries with 
a dominant culture. A proponent of group differentiated rights, he argues that the state, contrary to the 
contemporary liberal assumption of cultural neutrality, is ethno-culturally biased in favour of the 
dominant societal culture (Kymlicka, 1995: 15). Group-differentiated right and descriptive representation 
are beneficial in the debate on power-sharing institutions, because they both carry the same objective: 
making sure that they feel appreciated in society. This is what links the empirical debate and normative 
debate together. The empirical debate finds answers on how this should be achieved, while the normative 
debate ask: why should we care? 
An argument on institutionally favourable factors could possibly be strengthened if a link between ethnic 
hostility and the absence of group-differentiated rights is discovered. Disadvantagement, as Kymlicka 
calls it, can easily transcend into disillusionment (Kymlicka, 1995: 33). That is why it may be wise for 
states to recognize their ethnic minorities and give them the means to protect their cultural heritage. When 
ethnic groups do get disillusioned they will first try institutionalized means for conflict, such as strikes or 
demonstrations. Violence is observed in three ways: riots (non-peaceful demonstrations), pogroms 
(organized violence against unarmed members of an ethnic or societal group) and civil war (mutual 
violence between ethnic or societal groups) (Vanhanen, 1999: 61). It is often possible to remedy existing 
tensions, which may be violent, by awarding some group-differentiated, in the form of institutional 
change, to ethnic minorities. An example is the Good Friday Agreement in Northern-Ireland, which 
included an armistice as well as power-sharing institutional reforms, such as proportional representation 
and minority veto, to make politics more consensus-based, in 1998 (BBC, 2014). 
Group-differentiated rights may come in the form of institutions. For instance, federalism in Canada, 
where the Quebecois have self-governing rights, is a group-differentiated right (Kymlicka, 1995: 45). 
Bilingualism is also an example of institutionalized group-differentiated right. Belgium is an example 
where bilingualism was instated and Flemish was recognized as an official state language, just as French. 
Though Lijphart does not express his opinion on group-differentiated rights per se, he can easily be 
identified as a proponent. As one of the pillars of consociationalism, Lijphart makes a clear case for a 
degree of autonomy for societal groups (Lijphart, 1977).  
Group-differentiated rights follows a similar logic with the institutional approach that Lijphart uses. 
Awarding group-differentiated rights to, for example, ethnic groups, asks for an official recognition by 
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the state of a particular right. It is backed by legislation and therefore an institution. Assurance of 
minority representation can be understood in similar terms, it is widely applied around the globe in 
various forms. In the United States districts are shaped (gerrymandering) in such a way as to promote the 
election of minority representatives. The electoral system can also be used for such purposes, examples 
are mixed member proportional, single transferrable vote and other proportional representation using lists 
(Reynolds, 11). In some cases nations even opt for positive action mechanisms, such as quotas. In such 
cases positive action mechanisms, justified normatively by Kymlicka, are there to assure that no 
communal group is left behind in representational terms. 
Group-differentiated rights also employ a similar strategy of reconciliation and accommodation as 
consensus democracies and power-sharing institutions do to remedy ethnic division. They recognize 
group-differences and the fact that ethnic minorities then to get disadvantaged if they are not included in 
policy making. Power-sharing and group rights attempt to create a level playing field between ethnic 
groups and include all in cultural as well as political matters. By this logic it should not matter if one 
group has a majority or not, it matters that all ethnic groups have equal opportunities to acquire political 
representation and preserve their cultural heritage. The main reason group-differentiated rights are mainly 
expressed in political institutions is because the ‘rules of the game’ must encourage these equal 
opportunities for all. 
 
2. Methodology 
For this study, a qualitative paired comparative case study was performed, in which post-civil war 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and post-genocide Rwanda constitute the two cases. This study is about electoral 
institutions and their influence on the de-escalation of ethnic conflict. The cases are both new 
democracies. In Bosnia the civil war ended in 1995 and the first elections were held in 1996. From then 
the country was at least an electoral democracy with free and fair elections happening frequently. It 
makes sense to take 1996 as the starting point of the analysis. The late 1990s and early 2000s were most 
important for the development of Bosnia. The most important political crises took place then, and the 
‘Bonn-powers’ were used most frequently, therefore it makes sense to focus the analysis on these years. 
Formally the ‘Bonn-powers’ are still at force, because Bosnian federal governments are still unstable and 
unable to pass legislation. The current High Representative, Valentin Inzko has held the post since 2009. 
His role is far from played out in Bosnian politics as he remains the principle policy maker. This makes 
looking at the more recent development interesting. However, there is extensive literature available about 
the first decade after Dayton so such a period from 1996 until 2006 makes most sense, even though newer 
reports and literature should not be excluded if proven relevant.  
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An important part of the analysis of Rwanda happens at an interval of the civil war, when peace was 
negotiated in Arusha. The civil war between the predominantly Tutsi Front Patriotique Rwanda (RPF) 
rebels and the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement (MNDR) 
government, run by Hutu extremists, was underway since 1990, but the international community 
pressured the government of Rwanda to democratize and start peace talks. The peace talks did more harm 
than good, because Hutu extremists in the government were already making the Tutsi scapegoats of 
everything wrong with the country. When president Habyarimana’s plane was killed in plane crash the 
government moved against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Exterminating all political adversaries in a 
genocidal campaign with power as the ultimate goal. 
After this brutal government orchestrated massacre the analysis of Rwanda will commence with collapse 
of the MNDR government and the instalment of the RPF government at the end of the genocide in July 
1994 and end in 2010. In 2012 the gacaca, civil local tribunals for genocide, concluded their work. This 
signals the end of an era: the genocide ceases to influence the daily conduct of Rwanda’s internal affairs. 
However, in 2010 the last presidential elections were held, so concluding the analysis in 2010 seems the 
best option, for the same reason as in Bosnia. Furthermore for Rwanda it will be useful to make a 
distinction between the transitional period from 1994-2003 in which there were no elections held and the 
period from 2003 until 2010. In the latter period there were elections and in the beginning of it a new 
constitution was implemented. All in all a more useful period to observe the effect of our independent 
variable, electoral institutions, on the dependent variable, ethnic conflict. 
Variables  
In this section I will shortly outline how the most important variables in my analysis are operationalized. 
Starting with the dependent variable, ethnic conflict, then the independent variable, electoral institutions, 
finally other variables that are expected to interact with ethnic conflict in post-conflict societies such as 
Bosnia and Rwanda. 
Dependent variable 
To restate it once more, this research is focused on the de-escalation of ethnic conflict. This concept can 
already be split in two relevant components according to Horowitz: institutionalized ethnic conflict and 
violent ethnic conflict (Horowitz, 1985). An example of the operationalization of this twofold nature of 
ethnic conflict is provided by Vanhanen. First, he quantifies the concepts of institutionalized ethnic 
conflict and violent ethnic conflict on interval scales from zero to one-hundred (0 = no conflict at all, 100 
= extreme ethnic conflict). On the scale of institutionalized ethnic conflict he looks for the vote share of 
ethnic parties, the degree to which interests are characterized along ethnic conflict lines, the degree of 
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discrimination of ethnic groups and their size, and the degree to which interest groups are ethnically based 
(Vanhanen, 1999: 61).  
Second, On the scale of violent ethnic conflict he looks for the occurrence of ethnic demonstrations, 
ethnic riots and the degree of violence. Violence is operationalized very mild in the beginning, starting 
with some tensions, destruction of property or violence against individual persons. As we move up the 
scale ethnic rebellion, acts of terrorism and ethnic war become part of the equation. As first 
demonstration and later violence becomes more widespread the scale moves up in increments of 10 points 
up to a maximum of 100. On the top of the scale stand ethnic civil wars and separatist wars, ethnic 
cleansing, deportation, and eventually genocide (Vanhanen, 1999: 62). 
However, quantifying ethnic conflict is not very useful for my research design. Concurrently, the 
occurrence of parties and interest groups that are ethnic by nature is not expected to change dramatically 
over the course of the approximately twenty years we study ethnic conflict in Bosnia and Rwanda. 
Vanhanen’s operationalization of ethnic conflict is useful  on the grounds that it provides me with clear-
cut indicators for the degree of institutionalized and violent ethnic conflict; his work provides me with 
criteria to look for. So actual numbers, that Vanhanen uses his comparative research on ethnic conflict, 
will not be included in the research, his measures of institutionalized and violent conflict can be used to 
judge my cases on, because these measures represent a scale of severity (Vanhanen, 1999: 61). To give an 
idea of how he derives his numbers, I shall include replicas of two of his tables in which we makes this 
clear. 
Independent variable 
From the theoretical discussion of the Pipa Norris’ work on summarizing the Consociational Theory a 
great deal of mechanism behind our research question can be unrevealed. In figure 1 she summarizes the 
“Core Sequential Steps in Consociational Theory”. An important part are the influence on proportional 
electoral systems with low thresholds and positive action mechanisms for minorities, for example 
boundary delimination, communal rolls and reserved seats (a more detailed discussion in chapter (…) ). 
Because I am interested in these particular institutions I shall combine PR with low threshold and positive 
action mechanism into the independent variable electoral institutions. There are a number of ways in 
which we can observe the Core Sequential steps of Consociational Theory in practice. 
First, the electoral institutions are expected to facilitate the election of representatives and parties drawn 
from minority communities. This is clearly something we can test. Are ethnic groups for instance 
represented on the highest levels of government (the executive and legislative) by politicians drawn from 
their communities? Second, once they are elected representatives of the ethnic groups they are drawn 
from, leaders have “strong incentives for cooperation, bargaining, and compromise, through the give and 
16 
 
take for legislative politics” (Norris, 2008: 107). It is expected that cooperation on the elite level will also 
build trust on the elite level. Finally, the polity is thus expected to become more stable and ethnic conflict 
between the communal groups is expected to decline. This can be best observed in the levels of ethnic 
violence, because the institutional conflict is more stable and also an important part in the sequential steps. 
The electoral institutions are expected to influence the de-escalation of ethnic conflict in the two post-
conflict cases. Actually the electoral institutions have a strong tendency to create multi-party systems. In 
multi-party systems it is difficult for one party to gain a majority of seats in parliament. Governments will 
then always consist of more than one party, which means power has to be shared. This results in a balance 
of power between the legislative and executive powers. Lijphart joined these variables together in the 
“executive-parties dimension” because these items (with corporatist interest groups) had shown to be 
closely related (1999: 244). Because I am only interested in the electoral institutions, I assume that 
proportional representation will force political elites to cooperate if they want to pass bills.  
I have given positive action mechanism special attention because they are an example of institutionalized 
group-differentiated rights. It is in the interest of this research to observe institutions that derive from 
group-differentiated rights separately from ‘regular’ electoral institutions. I expect the existence of 
positive action mechanisms to mitigate ethnic conflict. They increase the influence of minorities on policy. 
A minority veto is expected to produce a similar effect on the dependent variable, because it too increases 
influence of minorities can exercise. 
To summarize the effect of electoral institutions on ethnic conflict can be measured by, first of all the 
existence of proportional institutions that facilitate minority representation. Second leaders are drawn 
from ethnic groups and those leaders cooperate in the highest echelons of government. Fourth democratic 
support increases in society, and finally a reduction of (violent) ethnic conflict is observed paired with 
democratic stability. The type of electoral institutions is the independent variable, all the others (except 
ethnic conflict and democratic support, which are together the dependent variable) are intervening 
variables. 
Control variables 
Autonomy is especially in Bosnia very salient, because the state is highly decentralized, and in fact a 
federal state. Two of the ethnic groups have close ties with neighbouring countries, and they wish to 
increase the autonomy of the regions. The other ethnic groups wishes to increase the central states power. 
This is a division that can potentially influence our dependent variable. In Rwanda autonomy is expected 
to play a minor role, because one of the ethnic groups has a large majority in society, and minorities do 
not live in a clearly demarcated area. 
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I consider the history and culture of power sharing within elite cooperation as an important piece of 
information that can influence the relationship between institutions and ethnic conflict. The institutions 
for power sharing are in some cases present, but this does not necessarily entail peaceful coexistence 
within a heterogeneous society. Lijphart argues that elite cooperation can entail an effect called a self-
fulfilling prophecy. This means that because the elites of ethnic or societal groups cooperate, because they 
fear the instability, which arises from the deadlock, if they don’t (Lijphart, 1977: 35-36). If there is no 
prior history of elite cooperation, due to institutions or the lack of democracy, then elites may be less 
inclined to cooperate and play by the rules of the game. There is a possibility that extremist politician will 
aggravate ethnic divisions for electoral gain. If there is no culture of power sharing or a high degree of 
polarization, elites and ethnic groups can become disillusioned and ultimately violent.  
Societal trust is considered an important intervening variable as well. If societal trust is critically low and 
it is not attributable to one of the previous independent variables, there is still a very great chance of the 
escalation of ethnic conflict. In post-conflict situations societal trust is not expected to be high, but it is 
expected to be rising or at least stable, because in the event of violent ethnic struggle trust usually is non-
existent. 
Data 
The primary data on election results to assess whether or not the electoral institutions in our cases 
facilitate the election of representatives and parties drawn from minority communities, will come from the 
Global Elections Database, for Bosnia, and the African Elections Database, for Rwanda. By comparing 
percentages of the population composition with the compositions of the parliament we can assess whether 
this is the case. Using secondary data from literature sources and country reports provided by Freedom 
House an assessment can be made whether community leaders have incentives to cooperate. Their 
behaviour to one another will determine if cooperation has led to increased trust between elites.  
Democratic support will be measured using Freedomhouse and Minorities at Risk qualitative reports of 
our both cases. Because the link between the electoral institutions and democratic support is still 
theoretical, the reports only will not be helpful in making causal inferences about these to concepts. Still 
the reports on democratic support will help us in determining whether a particular set of institutions is 
working or not. Whether these institutions help decrease the amount of ethnic conflict in society or 
instead exacerbate it. 
To assess the dependent variable: ethnic violence, will be assessed using country reports provided by 
Freedomhouse and Minorities at Risk. In Vanhanen’s research both cases scored extremely high due to 
the genocide. Now ethnic violence has dropped a lot over the years as peace returned.  Institutional 
conflict can be assessed using election data from our two cases because the variable is measured primarily 
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by presence of ethnic parties. Election data helps us assess the electoral strength of ethnic parties. 
Ethnically based interest groups are also part of the assessment of institutionalized ethnic conflict. To 
assess this indicator the traditional social structures that represent citizens interests will be observed: trade 
unions and churches, though they are not as important as political parties. If parties, trade unions and 
churches are all organized along ethnic lines, it logically follows that interest conflict too takes place 
along ethnic lines, because these three organizations are the main aggregators and representatives of 
interest. Institutionalized ethnic conflict and ethnic violence indicators come together to provide an 
indication of the severity of ethnic conflict.  
Case Selection 
There are numerous noteworthy reasons for comparing Bosnia and Rwanda. Both countries have a history 
of extreme violence, in the form of genocide, due to ethnic conflict in their recent histories. Members of 
Rwandese society adhere to either the Hutu (84%) or Tutsi (15%) tribe, the main ethnic division (CIA 
Factbook, 2014a). Bosnian society is divided in three main groups: Bosniaks (48%), Bosnian Serbs 
(37.1%) and Croats (14.3%) (CIA Factbook, 2014b). Clearly these countries can be characterized as 
multi-ethnic societies. These cases offer my research a chance to examine the influence of electoral 
institutions on post-conflict politics with such extreme and therefore important cases.  
The main reason for choosing these two cases is the need for variation on the independent variable, 
electoral institutions. In Bosnia consociational democracy is still firmly in place, though it is extremely 
difficult to form and maintain government and enact bills. In Rwanda the consociational mechanisms 
have disappeared altogether. Government is dominated by a single party, the RPF, which is unlike 
Bosnian parties, not established along ethnic division, incorporating both Hutu’s and Tutsi’s. The bi-
ethnic setup seems to translate the demographic majority into an irreversible political majority (Lewis, 
1963). The comparison between Bosnia and Rwanda offers an opportunity to examine the post-conflict 
situation in two countries with distinct institutional frameworks. 
From Lijphart’s book Driving Democracy there can be derived nine favourable factors for consociational 
democracy, and while Stroh has already shown a lack of compliance with them, as theory suggested, it 
constitutes a good way of comparing the two cases (Lijphart, 2008: . First, I will describe the nine 
favourable factors for Rwanda and Bosnia, then I will draw a general conclusion on they comparability. 
The first of Lijphart’s factors is the absence of a solid majority group in either society. Given the numbers 
in the first paragraph the verdict is that Rwanda does not comply as it has a large majority (85%) 
belonging to the Hutu tribe. Bosnia does comply as no group is near a majority, even though the share of 
Serbs and Bosniaks is considerably higher than the share of Croats. The second factor is the absence of 
large socio economic differences. While Rwanda does not comply as it has a large income gap, nearly 60% 
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live with less than 1 US$ per day and a GINI-index of 46.8 (2000), Bosnia does with 17,9% poverty 
stricken citizens (far less than Serbia: 24,6%; and Croatia: 20,5%) and a GINI-index of 36,2 (2007)  
(Stroh, 2009: 12; Worldbank: 2014). Rwanda (two) and Bosnia (three) both comply with the third 
criterion: not too many groups. 
Regarding the fourth criterion, Rwanda does not comply, while Bosnia does comply, even though the 
ethnic Croats are with far fewer than the Bosniaks and Serbs, because it has a formal separation of powers 
(Dayton Agreement, 1995). Five, Bosnia has a small population of around 3,8 million inhabitants, while 
Rwanda has a lot more: approximately 10 million (Citation). With external dangers, Lijphart means, 
external dangers, such as war, that pressure elite to cooperate, but in Rwanda and Bosnia external dangers 
did more evil than good. In Bosnia the Kosovo War only polarized politics and in Rwanda the Tutsi 
rebellion in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo destabilizes the whole region (Freedomhouse, 
2014a). Seventh, overarching loyalties are absent in both, as in Bosnia the parallel religious, language 
(more dialect than actually different languages) and national cleavages impede overarching loyalties or 
the ability for cleavages to cross-cut. In Rwanda there is a sound basis: common language and culture, but 
distrust makes overarching loyalties impossible (Stroh). 
Table 1:  Lijphart’s favourable factors: comparing Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina  
 
 
Eighth, Federalism is absent in Rwanda all together. In Bosnia the country is formally divided in two 
entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpka. The first containing the Bosniak 
and Croat ethnic citizens, the second is inhabited by the Serbs. Finally, both countries completely lacked 
Favourable factors Compliance Rwanda Compliance Bosnia 
1) No solid majority group No Yes 
2) Absence of large socio- 
economic differences 
No Yes 
3) Not too many groups Yes Yes 
4) Groups are roughly of the 
same size (balance of power) 
No Yes 
5) A small or very large 
population size 
Neutral Yes 
6) External dangers Neutral No 
7) Overarching loyalties No No 
8) Federalism Neutral Yes 
9) Traditions of compromise   
and accommodation 
No No 
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any traditions of compromise and accommodation. Rwanda has been dominated by foreign powers (first 
Germany, then Belgium), and since independence a predominant party system. Bosnia has been part of 
three large multi-national states: the Ottoman Empire, the Austria-Hungarian Empire and Yugoslavia. So 
both countries do not comply on Lijphart’s last favourable factor. 
Given the contribution made by Spears (see theory section) on the psychological and institutional barriers 
that affect post-conflict countries such as Rwanda and Bosnia, with weak (central) institutions, there are 
other factors then those provided by Lijphart to compare the two countries. To elaborate, both countries 
have encountered the psychological barrier, caused by the civil war. It has proven difficult to cooperate 
with groups or leaders that used to by sworn enemies. Obviously the institutional barrier is valid for 
Rwanda, but it is also valid in Bosnia where strong central institutions were also absent to provide strong 
guarantees for power-sharing. The main difference is that in Bosnia international actors have made a 
commitment to provide those safeguards for them, for example by instating the Office of the High 
Representative and giving it the ability to intervene if necessary. This is something that Lijphart does not 
account for even in his more recent works, but it should be weighted in the comparison. 
 
3. Power Sharing institutions in Post-Civil War Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was, during the time it was part of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, an 
administrative unit. After the First World War Bosnia was assimilated completely in Yugoslavia that was 
Serb dominated. Not until after the Second World War was Bosnia reinstated as an administrative 
territory, and the country was used by Tito to balance Croat and Serb nationalism (Robinson et al. 2001: 
960). In the Yugoslav state an corresponding identity was forged, however separate nationalism of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes still existed, though this was suppressed by the central state. Power within the states 
was allocated in accordance with resources in a centralized nation state. The Croats, who hoped for a 
confederal state, did perceived themselves treated fairly, and this stimulated the emergence of a violent 
resistance movement, called the Ustashe. During the Second World War Serbian nationalists formed the 
Chetniks to fight the Germans, while the Ustashe collaborated with them (Posen, 1993: 36). 
Serbs and Croats already had a history with mutual conflicts and killings in the past decades, especially in 
World War Two (ibid.). With the emergence of armed nationalist militias, Ustashe and Chetniks, mutual 
distrust grew even more. In post-World War Two Yugoslavia the Muslim population was seen as a 
remnant of Ottoman imperialism and therefore not recognized as a perpetual part of the Bosnian territory 
(Robinson et al., 2001: 961). They found their allies in the Croats, that still felt dominated by the Serb 
population of Yugoslavia. A population that albeit being twice as big, was less wealthy that the Croats. 
When it became obvious that Yugoslavia was going to collapse, the fact that ethnic Serbs and Croats were 
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so dispersed across the Bosnian territory proved problematic (Posen, 1993: 37). Employing a pre-emptive 
strategy Serbian leader Milosevic made sure heavy weapon were taken from Croat territory, shifting the 
strategic advantage to the Serbs, while Croatia accelerated military preparations. The roots for the civil 
war in Bosnia, that followed from the collapse of Yugoslavia in smaller nation states, stemmed from 
history, but the cause were political extremists within Serb and Croat ranks, who increased mutual 
distrust and sparked the eventual conflict. (Posen, 1993: 37-39). 
From 1992 until 1995 Bosnia was torn by a civil war in which ethnic groups, namely the Croat, Bosniak 
and Serbian Bosnians clashed violently, ensuing in ethnic cleansing of territories that had been claimed 
by one of the ethnicities (Dahlman and Tuathail, 2005). Abhorred by this discriminatory violence, and 
World War Two still fresh in everyone’s memory, the international community imposed a peace 
settlement on the ethnic groups. The democratization of Bosnia was a primary goal in the peace 
settlement, publicly known as the Dayton Agreement, to ensure sustainable peace in the country, as was 
common policy from the 1990s (Manning, 2007: 253). The Dayton Agreement instituted all four of 
Lijphart’s classic characteristics of consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1977). My investigation focusses 
on the electoral institutions, but because these institutions cannot really be seen separate from other 
institutions of the state, such as the executive and the degree of centralization, I will briefly discuss the 
institutions of Dayton’s constitution for Bosnia in their totality, before returning to the discussion of the 
electoral institutions and their influence on the de-escalation of ethnic conflict. 
Grand Coalition 
Grand coalition takes on an interesting form in Bosnia, that is according to Lijphart ‘less suitable’ to 
consociational government. The executive is presidential and always consists of three representatives 
from the three ethnic groups, and is directly elected in federal elections. This is so because a presidential 
system usually entails a dominant single leader. The chairmanship of the presidency rotates between the 
three ethnicities every eight months regardless of the election results (CIA Factbook, 2014). This makes 
sure that not any of the ethnic leaders can hog the chairman position for too long, and makes sure that 
leaders of all significant parts of society participate in governing it (Lijphart, 1977: 31). In the elections 
for the presidency of Bosnia national identity is placed over competence. Members of smaller 
communities, that are not Croat, Serb or Bosniak, are unable to run for the presidency, because the 
constitutions prescribes the nationality of the members of the presidency. Simultaneously members of one 
entity are unable to elect a candidate of different ethnicity. However unlikely this may be in the near 
future, the way a grand coalition is formed in Bosnia is very inflexible, and prevents the voting across 
ethno-national lines (Bieber, 1999: 85). 
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Fig. 1: Ethnic composition of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina's population (data: CIA 
factbook 2000) 
Bosniak
Serb
Croat
Other
Proportional representation and positive action mechanisms 
The party system is dominated by political 
parties that have a strong linkage with one of 
the three ethnic groups in society, thus it can 
be labelled as an ethnic party system. In the case 
of the Parliamentary Assembly the seats are 
allocated by quotas to ensure that each 
ethnic groups has an equal number of 
representatives in parliament (Dayton 
Agreement, 1995: 70). The House of the Peoples consists of fifteen members (five Bosniak, five Croat, 
and five Serbs), who are elected by their ethnic groups. The same goes for the House of Representatives 
that is comprised of 42 members, 14 for each ethnic group. These two Houses together make up the 
Parliamentary Assembly. As being said they are elected by quota, this to make sure that all minorities are 
represented equally in the Assembly, though they are not represented proportionally. 
The institutions offer modes of equal representation rather than proportional representation. The first 
problem that arises with such rules is that they have institutionalized the existing ethnic order, thus 
stabilizing, reinforcing and perpetuating it (Belloni, 2001: 172). The party system incorporates at least 
two opposition parties, the Serbian SDS and the Croatian HDZ, that were armed opposition groups during 
the Bosnian War. Second, a similar problem arises as with the election of the presidency, voting across 
inter-ethnic lines is not possible, because constituents don’t have the possibility to elect a representative 
that is not part of their ethnic group (Bieber, 1999: 85). As for positive action mechanisms, Bosnia 
employs in boundary delimitation (not on purpose) and reserved seats (Norris, 2008: 107). Next I will 
discuss another positive action mechanism that promotes minority representation 
Minority veto 
Entity-voting constitutes the most important veto mechanism in the Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly. It 
is an example of Lijphart’s minority veto, because it is a way in which a minority group, in this case an 
ethnic group, can defeat decisions that are regarded as ‘vital interests’ (Lijphart, 1977: 36). The objective 
of minority veto is thus to safeguard against the tyranny of the majority where grand coalitions do not 
sufficiently deal with the problem. However, a minority veto can easily be misused, a grave danger, 
because it can encourage a tyranny of the minority, which is equally bad for the cooperation in a grand 
coalition as the opposite (Lijphart, 1977: 37). This is exactly what happens with the minority veto in the 
Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly, where it is used to often and causes a deadlock in parliamentary 
decisions (Bahtic-Kunrath, 2011: 901). Entity-voting, as the mutual veto is called in the literature, means 
that every parliamentary decision must be supported by at least one-third of the delegates elected from the 
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RS and the Federation of BiH in both houses (Bahtic-Kunrath, 2011: 902). Given that there are no rules in 
the Constitution or the rules of conduct in the parliament, entity-voting can be used to cripple 
parliamentary decisions on every possible subject (ibid.). The lack of restrictions was recognized in 2002 
and the minority veto was limited a bit (Caspersen, 2004: 583). 
Segmented Autonomy 
The three ethnic groups are divided over an federal state with two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Fed. of BiH) or the Republica Srpska (RS). The three groups acquired a certain degree of 
autonomy and a minority veto ensured that the ethnic groups could protect their ‘vital interests’(I will 
explain minority veto further below) (Belloni, 2001: 172, Lijphart, 1977: 36; Dayton Agreement, 1995: 
65-70). Tensions in Bosnian politics are still high. The Serbs and Croats continue to attempt to strengthen 
their regional autonomy at the expense of the joint institutions, while the Bosniaks try to strengthen the 
Bosnian state. The Serbs and Croats therefore accuse them of seeking dominance through institutional 
means (Belloni, 2001: 166; Bahtic-Kunrath, 2011: 913). While the Serbians have acquired their own 
entity in the federal state of Bosnia, the ethnic Croats share their entity with the Bosniak population. This 
central-peripheral division between the Croats and Bosniaks is relatively new. Formerly they were two 
co-existing nations new modes of cooperation have to be created to potentially create co-existence in the 
entity again. During the Bosnian War areas that after Dayton became the entities are largely mono-ethnic 
areas, while they belong to a weak multi-ethnic state (Bieber, 1999: 79).  
International involvement 
A very prominent role in the Bosnian political and policy process is taken by the Office of the High 
Representative, an ad-hoc institution, created by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Over the years it has 
gotten extraordinary powers of intervention in the Bosnian polity. The “Bonn power”, as they are called, 
mean that the OHR can redirect policy, pass or deny legislation, and most importantly sack any Bosnian 
politician that sabotages the Dayton Peace Agreement (Freedomhouse, 2004; Chandler, 2006: 340). Even 
though Bosnia is a formally independent nation, since 1997 when the Bonn summit of the Peace 
Implementation Council took place, the OHR can without any reason or without consulting the Bosnian 
people or politicians intervene drastically in Bosnian politics (ibid.). There have been talks in the past to 
alleviate the OHR from these powers, but international actors have to this day found it necessary to keep 
them in place (Freedomhouse, 2007). Freedomhouse has therefore justly regarded Bosnia an electoral 
democracy (Freedomhouse 2008). 
In this chapter the implementation of consociational institutions in Bosnia after the Dayton Agreement is 
examined in detail. It becomes clear that even though minority representation is institutionalized in its 
constitution, seats are not allocated proportionally, but equally to the three big ethnic groups in Bosnia. 
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Overarching loyalties are not rewarded at al by the current set of electoral institutions, because 1) 
constituents of an ethnic group can only express support for a political leader that belongs to the same 
ethnic group, 2) constituents that do not belong to one of the three ethnicities are unable to run for office. 
The electoral institutions appear to make it almost impossible for politicians to transcend the ethno-
nationalist divide in Bosnia. Scholars have criticized the electoral institutions of consociational 
democracies extensively on the grounds that the political salience of ethnic ties and identities are 
unintentionally increased by proportional representation and by positive action strategies. Bosnia may 
constitute an example of the danger of those settlements, because they reduce the incentive for trans-
ethnic cooperation by political leaders and non-ethnic electoral incentives (Norris, 2008: 110). The 
difficulty of cooperation of political elites that transcend ethnic differences is also increased by the 
minority veto, that can enable minorities to block all kinds of legislation, effectively paralyzing 
parliamentary decisions.  
This is particularly hard to swallow considering Bosnia ambitions to acquire EU-membership. Because 
ethnic antagonisms are institutionalized in the Bosnian party system, and because it is very difficult to 
reach decision due to the compromises politicians and political parties have to make, Bosnian politics and 
policy agenda tend to be very oriented on policy stability and the status-quo (Bahtic-Kunrath, 2011: 902). 
The policy stability strategy is most well suited to the Serbs, while the Croat and Bosniak politicians 
prefer the change of policy, though they have very different goals (Bahtic-Kunrath, 2011: 902-3). In 
chapter (..) the performance of Bosnia’s electoral institutions is analysed systematically, this chapter is to 
give a general idea of how the electoral institutions, which came in a package deal with other 
consociational institutions, are influencing reconciliation and stability in Bosnia.  
 
4. Bosnian electoral institutions in practice 
Given the very violent civil war that ended in 1995 and the ensuing Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), 
prospects for a peaceful and democratic Bosnia looked grim. The DPA arranged for power sharing 
institutions as I have shown in the last chapter. Now we will embark on a more thorough look in the 
electoral institutions and their influence on reduction of ethnic tension. 
Ethnic conflict 
All in all, the Bosnian society can be characterized by a high degree of segmentation; this is of course in 
line with Lijphart’s comments on the consociational democracy. Increasingly over the years of our 
analysis is characterized by the three distinct entities: the Serbian, Croat and Bosniak Bosnians. In the 
process of Dayton the international actors made sure that the three minorities were represented well 
within the institutions of the state, giving considerable autonomy to the entities: Republika Srpska (RS) 
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and the Federation of Bosnia i Herzegovina. A side-effect of these constitution building aims were that in 
that process they created a very weak central government. It legitimized the institutionalization of 
ethnicity into politics and society (Freedomhouse, 2005). A couple of issues are recurrent within inter-
ethnic conflict; I shall point them out in the following section. 
First of all, the returns policy has caused for considerable conflict in Bosnian society and even sabotage 
by politicians and government officials, most notably in the RS (Freedomhouse, 1998). The DPA 
arranged for the return of refugees to the homes they have abandoned during the Bosnian War (Dayton 
Agreement, 1995: 62). During the Bosnian War whole regions were ethnically cleansed, and the returns 
policy arranged the return of those displaced persons. Regional authorities have always tried to hinder 
these returns policies (Freedomhouse, 1998). For instance villages in the RS that were overwhelmingly 
populated by ethnic Bosniaks or Croats, were after the War in majority inhabited by Serbians. Regional 
authorities attempted to consolidate such territories and would allow the free movement of people to those 
towns, effectively sabotaging the returns policies.  
Eventually most refugees would not return, as they found refuge in territories in Bosnia that inhabited a 
majority of their own population or had migrated abroad. Those that would return, primarily did so to sell 
their property (Freedomhouse, 2001). Eventually ethnic cleansing during the War was consolidated after 
the War, contributing to a segregated society (Dahlman and Tuathail, 2005: 572). Much of the returns 
policy for minority civil war refugees did not happen, which means the ethnic groups are more 
territorially concentrated (Dahlman and Tuathail, 2005: 592). Some emigrated, some only returned to 
collect their possession or sell their properties and some did  not return at all. Members of an ethnic 
groups who live in a territory where they are a minority are subject to some discrimination. For instance, 
Muslims are unable to practice their religion in Croatian majority or Serbian majority territories, because 
their religious symbols or mosques are desecrated or destroyed. The discrimination also manifests itself in 
housing appointment, employment and social services. Also in academic circles are characterized by 
ethnic favouritism (Freedomhouse, 2005). 
Before the civil war started the distribution of the ethnic groups was comparable to ‘leopard spots’. They 
were distributed all over Bosnia (Minorities at risk, 2006b). Ethnic cleansing during the civil war has 
made territories less ethnically diverse and more concentrated. But not only ethnic cleansing had part in 
the change in demographics. Also the increased distrust made it so that Bosnian Croats wanted to live 
close to the Croatian border and the Bosnian Serbs in the RS, close to Serbia. It increased segregation in 
Bosnia, which was reinforced by not only distrust, but also the new institutional arrangements after 
Dayton. 
Second, ethnic conflict has become institutionalized into Bosnian society. The main interest groups (trade 
unions and churches) are almost always divided by ethnicity. The same goes for school that in order to 
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prevent “ethnic assimilation” choose to separate students. The most important political parties are 
ethnically based, and choose to attract their followers using nationalist rhetoric around elections. As 
stated in the past paragraph Bosnian society is characterized by a large amount of contempt and 
discrimination of people belonging to another ethnicity. 
Third, the center-periphery cleavage is very salient in Bosnian society and politics. Because DPA has 
separated Bosnia in a Bosniak-Croat and a Serbian entity, the distribution of power between the entities 
and central government was an important line of conflict. Usually the Bosniak politicians will try to 
increase the power of the central government, and the Croatian and Serbian politician will try to 
consolidate or increase the power of the entities or in the case of the Croatian leadership try to create their 
own entity (Freedomhouse, 2001). The OHR had to block legislation in 2010 when the Bosnian central 
parliament voted to prevent any future power transfer from the entities to the central government 
(Freedomhouse, 2010). 
Finally, though Bosnian society is and has been very segregated, to the extent that it resembles apartheid, 
the DPA has managed to lessen violence considerable and maintain peace in Bosnia. Besides violent 
attacks on individuals, that tried to return to the homes, journalists, that wrote critical pieces, and the 
assassination of a Croat leader in 1999, violence has been contained. No widespread unrest is reported, 
except demonstrations following the implementation of new rules of conduct for the central executive by 
the OHR. Following the then High Representative Lajcak’s initiative to revise the central government’s 
quorum regulations, that allowed a single cabinet minister to block proceedings by not showing up, large 
demonstrations commenced after the resignation of Nicola Spiric, who the country’s was prime-minister 
then (Freedomhouse, 2008). The crisis was averted eventually with legislation passed, but it signals the 
volatility of the current system. 
Ethnic representation 
The current institutions have very much favoured the representation of ethnic parties. Election results 
from 1996 until 2010 show that a large percentage of the elected parties have their roots in one of the 
ethnic groups. Looking at figure 1 the percentage of ethnic seats has been very high over the past 
elections, only in 2010 does it drop to 66,6%, which is still a high percentage of ethnic seats. When 
looking at the different groups, it becomes clear that the Bosniak, who make up 48% of  the population, 
are underrepresented to last elections with percentages ranging from 21,1 (in 2010) to 50 (in 1996). The 
amount of Serb, who make up 37,1% of the population, are underrepresented as well with percentages 
ranging from 19 (in 1998) to 33,3 (in 2010). The Croatian part of the population, around 14,3%, is 
represented well with percentage of seats ranging from 11,9 (in 2006 and 2010) to 19 (in 1996). The 
lower share of Serb and Bosniak seats then one would expect given their size in the population is mostly 
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due to the success of the multi-ethnic Social Democratic Party (SDP). Currently this party occupies 8 of 
the 42 seats in the Bosnian parliament (for more detailed information see Appendix 1). 
Ethnic representation in the Bosnian Parliament 
 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2006 2010 
Ethnic party seats 38 35 31 35 35 28 
%  90 83,3 73 83,3 83,3 66,6 
Multi-ethnic party seats 4 7 11 7 7 14 
%  10 16,6 27 16,6 16,6 33,3 
Fig. 1 shows the percentages of seats occupied by ethnic parties 
 
The claim that Bosnian elections would constitute an ethnic census seems justified despite some 
fluctuation (Reynolds, 2). Even though ethnic parties have an important role in Bosnian politics as most 
Bosnians vote for ethnic parties, especially in the presidency and the executive, there is also some support 
for multi-ethnic or independent parties. De facto ethnic parties have hold all the executive power in 
Bosnia, except two notable exceptions. First, the instalment of the Alliance for Change Coalition which 
was officially ethnically neutral and second, the election of Zeljko Komsic for the Croatian seat of the 
presidency despite not having a nationalist Croatian background or ideals; he can be considered the first 
ethnically neutral presidency member (Freedomhouse, 2001; 2007). 
It is safe to conclude that in Bosnia the electoral institutions did what was expected of them, according to 
Consociational Theory. PR and positive action mechanism did establish the election of parties and leaders 
from the ethnic groups. A large percentage of the parliamentary seats went to candidates with clear ethnic 
connotations that run for ethnic parties. This has established dominance of ethnic and nationalist parties 
over the executive institutions, such as entity governments, the national government and presidency. 
However in some cases the institutions have been discriminatory in nature as well: in 2006 two 
candidates, one Jewish and one Romanian, were excluded for running for presidency because they lacked 
the proper ethnicity. The European Court of Human Rights has judged such institutional arrangements to 
be discriminatory (Freedomhouse, 2010). It shows that institutions like those in Bosnia cannot include 
everyone. 
Elite Cooperation 
A weak central government made it very difficult to reform Bosnia politically or economically. DPA 
arranged for minority veto power, so policy could easily be blocked by one of the ethnic groups. Such 
provisions made passing reforms necessary for EU partnership difficult. The High Representative had to 
step in on a number of occasions. Dozens of local and national politicians were removed from office by 
the OHR. The positive action mechanisms and the electoral system of PR made sure that minorities were 
represented in political conduct. The party system has shown to overwhelmingly consist of ethnic parties, 
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and because of the tripartite nature of the main parties in the central state’s institutions and their different 
policy aims and objectives; it has been very hard to make the necessary policy reforms and to build 
coalitions to rule the country. Even though it can be argued that the OHR has helped to ensure a certain 
amount of stability and progress in Bosnia, it is not the most democratic. 
At the end of the 1990’s tensions between the three ethnic groups and their politicians were still very 
severe. In 1999 Bosnia had no functioning government for several months after first the Serb then the 
Croat leadership completely withdraw themselves from the central government. After the crisis was 
subdued Croatian Bosnian voted in overwhelming majority for the construction of their own entity, which 
was consequently rejected by the international community. In 2002 even an Alliance of Change coalition 
that was ethnically neutral proved not to be stable, because of a lack of cohesion (Freedomhouse, 2002a). 
It accomplished very little. At the time the Croats had retreated all of their people for state institutions, 
including the army, and instituted self-rule for a couple of months. 
During these times when Bosnian politicians did not manage to make compromises and pass legislation 
the international actors, most prominently the OHR, passed all the legislation and necessary reforms, 
which prevented the nation from slipping into international isolation. During the beginning of the 2000’s 
the OHR rejected numerous Bosnian politician from office, most were SDS members. 
In 2005 Bosnia and the EU entered in negotiations for the Stability Association Agreement, an important 
first step for EU membership. This happened after because progress was made by Bosnian politicians to 
meet EU criteria. However progress is still very slow. Conversely Bosnia was rejected for the NATO 
Partnership for Peace, because war criminals in the RS remained at large. For the first time steps are made 
in the right direction by Bosnian politicians.  
The literature on power-sharing suggests that the election of political representatives from ethnic groups 
would increase cooperation (Norris, 2008; Lijphart, 1977). This is not what is observed in the Bosnian 
case. Political leaders do not have similar objectives and policy preferences (when it comes to 
centralization/de-centralization for instance) (Belloni, 2001: 166; Bahtic-Kunrath, 2011: 913). This is not 
problematic on itself, because it can solved by a trade-off of policy positions (Norris, 2008: 111). To 
create a consensus that is acceptable to all groups. Willingness to achieve such a consensus is present 
apparently in Bosnia.  
The country is in a political crisis since 2012 when a government with the SDP and SDA collapsed. 
Because the SDA blocked the dismissal of ministers and SDA used their veto rights, to block a new 
government, the political situation was jammed once again. The battle was taken on to the courtroom as 
the SDA blocked the appointment of a judge for the Constitutional Court, because it supposedly harmed 
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their interests as well (Freedomhouse, 2014a). Generally political parties use their veto powers much too 
often, which is very bad for effective policy making. 
The vetoes exceed their goals. The original goal of the mutual veto is to make sure that minorities do not 
have their interests harmed by majority decision, but parties have to be very reserved when exercising this 
right (Lijphart, 1977: 37-38). If parties use it too much, it will cause policy deadlock. Parties in Bosnia 
misuse their power when it comes to the mutual veto, so the institution is more of a nuisance than a help. 
The orientation of the veto is usually to protect the status-quo. The veto is misused  because not all 
relevant players accept on another and grant each other favourable policies (Bahtic-Kunrath, 2011: 918). 
Therefore the veto becomes an instrument of gridlock, instead of a safeguard for ‘tyranny of the majority’. 
Institutions should be designed to prevent possibilities for political groups to hijack institutions for their 
exclusionary interests (ibid.; Freedomhouse, 2014a). 
Democratic consolidation 
The OHR has played a considerable role in keeping the Bosnian policy building process, in order to 
achieve the goal of EU partnership, flowing and its democracy working. Especially in the first years after 
the DPA the OHR made sure that Bosnian politician did not make the same faults as before, when 
political deadlock led to the Serbs attempting to secede from Bosnia. The influence of the OHR and 
consociational institutions in general have not been more focused on results and the inclusion of the 
ethnic groups. The institutions implemented by Dayton had the objective to give Bosnia’s politicians a 
coping mechanism for the extreme dividedness in society, that manifests itself in a segregated society. 
However, it remains hard to argue that consociational institutions in general, and PR and positive action 
mechanisms in particular, have been a great success. A great success would have been the case if the 
difficult reforms, such as constitutional reforms, would eventually be implemented on initiative and by 
consensus of the Bosnian politicians. One of the more successful examples of consociational democracy 
was the Netherlands from 1917 until 1968, where despite a divided society legislation was passed and 
governments were build and survived. Given the experiences of Bosnian politics, it can be argued that 
minorities were represented quite well, but consensual politics was not established in a sustainable and 
reliable fashion. 
The gridlock in policy and decision making makes the Bosnian democracy, as far as one can speak of 
Bosnian ‘ownership’, unstable. The root cause of the gridlock can be found in the institutional 
arrangements and the exploitation of these arrangements by the Bosnian politician to serve exclusionary 
interests. Critics of consociational democracy have made this point. The low thresholds and institutions 
that are favourable for minority interest can be used by extremists. In some cases they make the trade-offs 
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necessary for good political conduct less likely, especially in post-conflict societies (Norris, 2008: 110-
111). 
Ethnic conflict 
Assessments made by Minorities at Risk and Freedomhouse all agree that there is a small potential for 
rebellion within each of the three national minorities. The most important reason both research collectives 
give for the lack of potential is that all groups have gotten representation at the various level of 
government. Political pluralism is high, as there are ethnic political parties represented in regional and 
national assemblies for every ethnic group. Overall, the Croats are overrepresented considering their share 
of the population and the Serbs and Bosniaks are underrepresented. These arrangements were made in the 
General Framework Agreement for peace in BiH and agreed upon by all parties so they pose no problems. 
(Dayton Agreement).  
While there are still demonstrations in all parts of the country, these efforts are generally small and 
peaceful (Minorities in risk, 2006). The involvement of international actors, most notably the OHR with 
the “Bonn powers”, makes sure that peaceful demonstrations cannot escalate into widespread rebellion. 
Since the civil war demographic distribution of the ethnic groups has changed from “leopard spots” to 
more concentrated areas, where one group has a clear majority. Though the concentration of ethnic 
groups as a result of ethnic cleansing during the civil war has made federalism and groups autonomy 
possible, there is now discrimination of ethnicity in parts where that groups is minority. Croats primarily 
live close the Croatian border and Serbs primarily in the RS. Especially the Croats, while they are 
overrepresented in the country’s institutions, feel threatened and opt for even greater autonomy. At this 
moment they have to share an entity with the Bosniaks. 
Judging on Vanhanen’s criteria, ethnic conflict is very institutionalized. Every group has a wide array of 
political parties that serve the groups interest in the various levels of government. Violent ethnic conflict 
it very limited, to only a small amount of peaceful demonstrations. There is discrimination, in 
employment or religious freedoms  for instance, in areas where the group is not a majority. Also there are 
some incidents of inter-ethnic violence reported, but this sporadic in nature. Problems arise most for 
ethnic members if they live in areas where they are a minority (Minorities at Risk, 2006c; Minorities at 
risk, 2006d). 
 
5. Power sharing institutions in post-Arusha Rwanda 
The Hutu tribe originally came to the area around 1000 AD and were farmers. The Tutsi came to the land 
that is now Rwanda some 400 years later. Traditionally the Tutsi have been the ruling class of Rwanda, 
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but this dominance, supported by the colonizers, ended in 1959 with a Hutu rebellion (Freedomhouse, 
1999). Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement (MRND) was the 
predominant party during that period, its last president Juvenal Habyarimana led the country from 1973 
until 1994.  
Our description of the Rwandan case starts in 1990, when the RPF started an rebellion against the MRND. 
The nation was effectively in a state of war, which meant an overall collapse of the domestic economy. 
The civil war that went on for three years, made sure that the MRND government, known for its 
clientalist tendencies (the catering to the akazu, powerful clique of Northern Hutu), had to give in to 
pressures from NGO’s, such as the IMF and Worldbank, to make peace and democratize (Hintjens, 2001: 
23). Successful military operations by the RPF and the creation of a coalition government, which 
included opposition parties, led to peace negotiations in Arusha between the RPF and the government of 
Rwanda (Reyntjens, 1996: 234). The Arusha negotiations not only provided an equal footing for the RPF 
to the Rwandan government, its subsequent Accord included a number of democratic reforms that would 
take a lot of the akazu’s and government’s  power away. It is argued that a market-dominant minority is 
the Achilles’ heel of free market democracy. Concentration of wealth is perceived in such a group, 
democracy does the opposite: it increases the political power of the majority. Ambitions for democracy 
fuel ethno-nationalism, antagonizing a frustrated majority, by political opportunists, against a hated 
minority. (Reyntjens, 2007: 1104) 
The Arusha Accord, including protocols agreed on in 1992 and 1993, together with the Constitution of 
1991 was to provide a Fundamental Law for the transitional period (Reyntjens, 1996: 235). First of all, 
the president was stripped of his political power, which were reduced to that of a ceremonial head of state. 
Much alike constitutional monarchs in Western Europe his appointments are imposed on him, and he is 
obligated to sign approved laws and decrees. The real executive power lay with the Broad-based 
Transition Government (BBTG), that consisted of six political parties, most notably the RPF and MRND 
(ibid.). The seats of this twenty-one member executive were distributed by a formula that made sure that 
at least three parties’ approval or a two-thirds majority was required (ibid.). Such an executive clearly 
depict the characteristics of the grand coalition which should include all the major political parties 
(Lijphart, 1977: 32). 
Similarly a Transitional National Assembly was implemented by the Arusha Accord in a parliamentary 
relationship with the BBTG. Like the BBTG its seats were also fixed in advance. The assertion made by 
Reyntjens that the institutional changes brought by the Arusha Accord were incredibly radical, especially 
when it is compared by the former regime, a presidential system backed by a predominant party 
(Reyntjens, 1996: 235-236). The system did never function, because this “would probably have been just 
a theoretical possibility” (Reyntjens, 1996: 235). The developments were caught up by current events. 
32 
 
Concurrently with the Arusha negotiations, the residing government of Habyarimana, known for its 
corruption, clan-based politics and discrimination, was very afraid of losing its power due to democratic 
reforms to the RPF (Hintjens, 2001: 35). It began an enforcement of differential forms of citizenship, 
embarking a propaganda mission to define the Tutsi population on racial terms and as an enemy from 
within (Hintjens, 2001: 26). All Tutsi were equated with the regimes military enemy: the RPF. This 
meticulously planned and state-led policy of hate eventually culminated in Rwandan genocide. 
The genocide profoundly influences political conduct in Rwanda to this day. It is for this reason I explore 
the reasons for it so thoroughly. It helps us understand the de-escalation of the ethnic conflict much better, 
and helps us pinpoint the influence of the electoral institutions better. Even the Arusha Accord, which 
despite international efforts, proved to be unable to solve any of the political problems Rwanda was 
facing at the time, is a continuing source of legitimacy for the Rwandan government led by the RPF. In a 
transitional period after the genocide, the government promised to stick to the provisions made in Arusha. 
It turns out that under the pretences of consociational democracy the RPF lead government was 
accumulating power and limiting opposition in the transitional period that ended with the approval of the 
2003 Constitution (Reyntjens, 2007: 1106; Hintjens). In the next section I will review the institutional 
arrangements of Rwanda and the acquiescence of the RPF to absolute power. 
Post-genocide Rwanda 
The RPF that seized power in Rwanda initially received a great deal of credit from the international 
community, that stood idle as 800,000 people were massacred, for ending the genocide. It was widely 
assumed that, despite clear signs of a surge to authoritarianism, Rwanda was transitioning into a 
democracy (Reyntjens, 2007: 1103). This transition paradigm has been criticized extensively in literature 
that uses the Rwandan case as an example (Stroh, 2009: 6, Reyntjens, 2007: 1103). In order to 
consolidate its power the RPF government, amended the Arusha Accords provisions, which were 
constructed in the spirit of power-sharing. The amendments reintroduced a strong executive president, 
redrew the parliament’s composition and imposed the RPF’s dominance on political power. While doing 
making these provisions the RPF attempted to mask their hold on power, a façade that continues to this 
day (Reyntjens, 2007: 1105; Stroh, 2009: 15). I will return on the appropriation of power by the RPF later 
and the role the electoral institutions. First I will elaborate on the ethnic policies of the RPF government, 
by which they effectively ban the notion of ethnicity from political and public life. 
An essential of the RPF’s apprehension of political power, was the absolute denial of ethnicity to be a 
factor in Rwanda’s political life. The RPF tried to emphasize ‘national unity’ by giving Hutu seats in the 
executive, and they introduced an official policy of human equality by claiming that all citizens are 
Rwandans (Banyarwanda) (Reyntjens, 2007: 1109; Stroh, 2009: 8). The notion of Tutsi ethnicity has 
changed also. Instead of referring to the pre-1994 domestic Tutsi as such, they are now called genocide 
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survivors (Stroh, 2009: 10). The policy of Banyarwanda has masked to fact that the higher, but less 
visible, echelons of government are RPF-isation and Tutsi-isation, and that they have fashioned 
themselves the new akazu (Reyntjens, 2007: 1109-10). The akazu is a title for the political elite and the 
accompanying clientalist network.  
The objective of Banyarwanda policy was the crafting of a new Rwandan national identity. It proved 
once again shows that social identities are not rigid at all (Horowitz, 1985: 74). This strategy of ethnic 
denial was successfully employed in other small Tutsi-led government, such as in Rwanda in the 1950s 
and in Burundi between 1965 and 1988. The strategy is clearly to de-institutionalize ethnic conflict. 
Whether it will work time will tell, but past experience has shown that forcing an identity on a societal 
group can even prove to work counterproductive, as is often a consideration in integration policies of 
Western governments (de Zwart, 2005: 138). 
The appropriation of power started with the façade of continuing of the Arusha Accord, while it was 
amended to allow RPF executive dominance (Stroh, 2009: 8). Then the RPF aimed to de-institutionalize 
the ethnic conflict, by rejecting the notion of ethnicity as a politically relevant line of conflict, and by 
banning the former dominant party MNRD and the extremist Coalition pour la defence de la Republique 
(CDR). Initially, in 1994, the Hutu Faustin Twagiramungu from the Mouvement démocratique 
républicain (MDR) became the prime minister as provided by the Accord, though in 1995 he and other 
Hutu ministers had to resign in 1995 and subsequently went into exile (Reyntjens, 2007: 1105). From 
early 1995 Hutu political elites had to endure harassment, imprisonment and violence. Eventually the 
MDR, that was the biggest opposition party until then, was banned by the government because of the 
alleged spreading of ‘divisionism’ in Rwandan society (Reyntjens, 2007: 1107). The notion of a Hutu 
political party went against the Banyarwanda policy. Thereby limiting political pluralism as well as other 
civil liberties like, freedom of press, association and expression for instance, made sure that after the 2003 
elections the RPF was the predominant party in Rwandan political affairs. 
The official view of the Rwandan government is that elections are an instrument of democratization. The 
‘language’ of consensual politics and democracy is to their official statements used in order to justify its 
institutional choices. By these words the Rwandan government cater to the internationally dominant 
paradigm of transition to democracy, but it is accepted that the citing Lijphart’s model of consociational 
democracy in state documents is nothing more that “a sophisticated and convenient reference to the 
academic debate” (Stroh, 2009: 11).  
The international community has expressed a strong preference for electoral rules that enable the 
emergence of ethnic parties (Reilly, 2006: 814). This was also the case in Rwanda which had relatively 
‘permissive’ electoral institutions: proportional representation in a single district comprising the whole 
country, with a five per cent threshold (ibid., Stroh, 2009: 9). Only fifty-three seats are open to direct 
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election for the Rwandan parliament, which is composed of two houses: the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate. The rest of the seats are allocated to minority groups, such as women, and are thus fixed. The 
president, who now enjoys considerable executive power again, is elected directly by the Rwandan 
citizens (Stroh, 2009: 8). 
Note that it is not the intention to characterize Rwanda as a consociational democracy as it fits the 
characteristics and favourable factors devised by Lijphart poorly (Stroh, 2009: 11-12). The institutions of 
Rwanda can nowadays be best understood as those of electoral authoritarianism. The role of PR is very 
important in this regime and I will elaborate much more on the role of the electoral institutions in chapter 
7. This chapters aim was to give the reader a general idea of independent variable of this research, the 
electoral institutions, and how they developed over time. How the electoral system influences the 
institutionalization of ethnic conflict and the occurrence of ethnic violence will also be an important 
puzzle of this research. 
 
6. Rwandan electoral institutions in practice 
After a transitional period that lasted from 1994 until 2003 Rwanda finally saw its first multi-party 
parliamentary elections since 1961. During the transitional period the RPF led a self-appointed 
government for Rwanda. The political parties that played a part in the genocide were all banned. Except 
for the Movement Democratique Rwanda (MDR) there was no Hutu political party. Hutu in Rwanda were 
only represented by prime-minister Bernard Makuza. Throughout the period of the analysis the RPF is the 
predominant party in Rwanda and it closely directed political life in the polity (Freedomhouse 2002b). In 
fact the multi-party parliamentary elections were move to legitimize the regime both to its population and 
the international community. In the next section this strategy and the implications for ethnic conflict will 
be discussed. 
Starting in the transitional period a number of civil and political liberties were limited in Rwanda, by 
which the RPF helped secure ownership of the Rwandan state for itself in an authoritarian fashion. First 
of all, media, both written and broadcasting media, were censored. They did this either voluntarily, 
because the fear of harassment and reprisal, or were silenced by the government, that did not fear using 
violence or ‘disappearances’ to ensure their silence (Freedomhouse, 2001b). The media did play an 
important part in the realization of the genocide, as it was used by the government to broadcast hate 
propaganda against Tutsi citizens in the years before the genocide. Therefore the media is under intense 
scrutiny of the government.  
Second, the RPF limited political pluralism considerably. The party has allowed for other parties to exist 
next to them. For instance, the Parti Socialiste Democratique (PSD) and the Parti Liberale (PL), that have 
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been established before the genocide and did not play an active role in it. There are also a number of 
parties that run on a collective ballot with the RPF, which I am not going to name all. Important is to note 
that the RPF has not allowed Hutu parties under the current electoral system, PR with a four per cent 
threshold. The Hutu parties MRND and CDR have, understandably, been banned for their active role in 
the genocide, however another Hutu dominated party MDR has been banned as well under allegations of 
causing “dividedness” (Freedomhouse, 2002b). 
Third, the limitation of political pluralism is enforced by the Political Party Forum, a political parties’ 
branch organization if you will, that is under control of the RPF. Further attempts to establish independent 
parties, such as the effort of former president Pasteur Bizimungu, have been answered by criminal 
charges. Bizimungu was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, but was released after five years. The 
conviction is generally regarded as a political sentence. The judiciary system, which had to be built from 
the ground after 1994, is not independent, and subject to political influence (Freedomhouse, 2004b). 
By limiting political pluralism and disrespecting some civil liberties, such as the freedom of press, speech 
and association, the RPF has created a strong power base for itself. By Freedom House Rwanda is not 
even regarded an electoral democracy, such a term for illiberal polities with free elections, but can be 
characterized best as an authoritarian state (Freedomhouse,  
Ethnic group members in national legislatures (Rwanda 2003-2008) 
Ethnic group Population (%) Seats (%) Over/under 
Hutu 84 0 -84 
Tutsi 15 62,3 47,3 
Twa 1 0 -1 
National legislatures composition (Rwanda 2008-2013) 
Ethnic group Population (%) Seats (%) Over/under 
Hutu 84 0 -84 
Tutsi 15 67,9 52,9 
Twa 1 0 -1 
Figure 1: overrepresentation of the Tutsi population and Hutu underrepresented in parliament 
2007b). The RPF, itself a Tutsi dominated party, has not allowed for the accession of an ethnically Hutu 
party to democratic elections, therefore the Tutsi part of the population that after the genocide still 
comprised 14% of the population, while the Hutu are 84% of the population. As one can see in figure 1 
the Tutsi population is since the introduction of proportional representation is overrepresented by a very 
large amount in the Rwandan parliament, while the Hutu who comprise an overwhelming majority within 
the population is under represented. This is obviously due to the governments limiting of political 
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pluralism under the pretext of it causing “dividedness”, the Banjarwanda policy. Certainly in this case an 
electoral system of proportional representation does not render the election of representatives from all 
communal groups. 
Generally it is believed by policy makers and scholars that elections are an instrument of democratization 
in divided societies. Supporters of the transition paradigm understand elections as a contribution to the 
establishment of democracy (Stroh, 2009: 6). The Rwandese government understood such ideas very well, 
and through its rhetoric tried to support this conception that Rwanda through PR and positive action 
mechanism, which are mostly gender based, not ethnically based, was democratizing and conducting in 
consensual politics (Stroh, 2009: 10-11). Instead of PR electoral institutions being part of a consociational 
package, PR is the electoral policy under authoritarianism; it can be expected that PR in such 
circumstances has some ‘unintended undemocratic effects’ (Stroh, 2009: 12). 
PR to consolidate a predominant position 
The first elections in 2003 with PR institutions, with a low threshold and a single large constituency, were 
only held when the RPF had a firm grip on the state’s legal and executive institutions. It has been 
suggested by international observers, such as Freedom House, and scholars that the actual objective of PR 
was not the representation of minorities (or majority in this case), but legitimizing the regime, by making 
the election results appear more democratic than they actually were (Freedomhouse, 2010b; Stroh, 2009: 
17). Stroh calls it the power maintenance approach; by performing a counterfactual analysis, he shows 
that the election results with SMD or smaller proportional districts would deliver the RPF 100% of the 
seats (Stroh, 2009: 18-20). 
The multi-party system that sprung from the introduction of PR has not meant that the RPF had to 
cooperate with other parties to pass legislation. Some of the parties that ran on the RPF’s ballot did not 
expect to meet the electoral threshold so decided to place themselves on the common list (Stroh, 2009: 
10). Simultaneous with the introduction of PR positive action mechanism were installed to ensure the 
election of a considerable amount of female MPs. In fact, Rwanda is the first country ever to have a 
majority of MPs to be female. Most women are even if they ran for independent women representative 
seats, closely linked to the RPF (Bauer, 2008; ibid.). Neither smaller parties, nor specially elected 
individuals hold power to veto the RPF’s decisions in the same way as for example Bosnia. For Stroh it 
confirms Rwanda’s status as an electoral autocracy (Stroh, 2009: 19) 
Ethnic conflict 
Ethnic conflict, manifesting itself in two distinct features, has lowered quite a bit in the past decades in 
Rwanda. Due to the repressive tendencies of the current regime, ethnic conflict is less institutionalized, 
though some doubts can be placed with the modus operandi of the RPF regime. Violent conflict has also 
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lessened compared to the first half of the 1990s. Still there is scattered violence, but it is no longer 
directed to one single rebel movement, like the RPF once was. I will discuss the developments on 
institutionalized ethnic conflict and violent ethnic conflict in the following section and why I think the 
electoral institutions have not influenced these developments. 
Institutionalized ethnic conflict manifests itself through the occurrence of ethnic parties, interest groups 
and interests being structured along ethnic lines (Vanhanen, 1999). Horowitz defines the ethnic party as: 
“the test of an ethnic party is simply the distribution of support [because] in practice, a party will serve 
the interests of the group comprising its overwhelming support or quickly forfeit that support (1985: 
293)”. With the exception of the RPF, none of the parties in the Rwandan party system can be considered 
ethnic, because only the RPF’s cadre is truly ethnic. This because it is prohibited by law. Given the fact 
that the RPF leads a de facto single party government, the share of ethnic seats could even be considered 
one-hundred per cent, because the RPF is a Tutsi dominated party. Conversely interest groups are hardly 
ever ethnically structured. Trade unions for example have greater autonomy than they had under the pre 
1994 dictatorship (Freedomhouse, 2007b). For churches a similar argument can be made. Unlike Bosnia 
for instance there is religious freedom in Rwanda, mainly because religion is not ethnically determined 
(Freedomhouse, 2001b). 
Violence in Rwanda has lessened a lot, which is as suspected after such a violent episode as the year 1994. 
Most of the tension and potential for violence seems to come from neighbouring countries such as 
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the Rwandese government supposedly 
backs Tutsi rebels (Freedomhouse 2010b). Internally the country has remained relatively peaceful. There 
are no structured anti-government militia anymore, no real rebellion by Hutu who fled abroad after the 
genocide. Acts of violence that did happen were targeting individuals, not ethnicity in general, and are 
isolated in nature. A very positive notion is that refugees that fled after the RPF takeover have almost all 
been returned to Rwanda and have not been prosecuted en masse by the government, though people 
suspected of war crimes are indicted by gacaca tribunals or by the ICRT based in Arusha (Freedomhouse, 
2002b). 
Conclusively one might add that the progress made by the government was not done democratically in 
any sense. It limits political pluralism and civil liberties, but it has managed to shed the violence from 
Rwandan society and made sure that victims and perpetrators of the genocide can now live side by side 
once more. As Stroh has argued the country does not meet the criteria provided by Lijphart that are 
favourable for consociational democracy (2009: 14). Its government has found other, more repressive, 
forms to limit political competition. In the light of Rwanda’s very violent past these measures are as good 
as any. They did not led to more democracy, as the transitional paradigm predicts, but it has led to a 
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sustainable peace and lessening of the ethnic conflict, though the political oppression of the Hutu will 
have to end in the future or it could spell a new era of violence, as the former oppressive regime did. 
 
7. Discussion and comparison 
I started this thesis with a discussion of ethnicity and ethnic violence: how the current political scientific 
literature regards institutions, how they influence the development of ethnic conflict in divided societies 
in general, and, more specifically, in societies that are recuperating from a civil war. In a democracy the 
electoral institutions are certainly an important force in mitigating ethnic conflict: they can enforce the 
election of representatives from all parts of society, as well as inspiring politicians to build consensus 
instead of schism in some cases (Lijphart, 1977; Norris, 2008). The Netherlands are a prime example of 
that mechanism, which Lijphart at first based his concepts of consociational democracy and the 
encompassing electoral institutions PR on. PR is the go to institution for constitutional engineers when 
drafting new rules for a post-conflict society. Power-sharing and proportional representation can certainly 
lower the stakes of conflict and provide an equitable solution to the “who rules” question (Lijphart, 1977). 
One problem is that if one excepts the premises of power-sharing and consocialism it becomes difficult to 
imagine any other strategy (Spears, 2010: 10). 
However, power-sharing institutions are not  a universal cure for every post-conflict situation (Boogaards, 
2013; Dixon, 2011). The Arusha Peace Process has shown that Rwandan leaders were not willing to share 
power at the time (Spears, 2010: 10; Norris, 2008: 107). Spear remarks that “ […] having Tutsis share 
power with Hutu extremists was akin to the Jews agreeing to share power with the Nazis or the 
Armenians cooperation with the Turks” (Kaufmann, 2002: 145) and that “as desirable as it might be for 
outsiders, such arrangements may be unpalatable for belligerent parties to accept” (Spears, 2010: 11).  
A comparison between Rwanda and Bosnia certainly shows that these countries would not be where they 
are today if it weren’t for undemocratic elements. In Bosnia the High Representative had to intervene 
repeatedly to pass legislation and remove subversive elements from political ranks. In Rwanda the 
authoritarian government simply banned ethnicity, simply commanding the Rwandan people to be 
“united” (Reyntjens, 2007: 1109). I think it shows that in such extremely violent situations as genocide 
and ethnic cleansing, democratic ideals should be put on hold. In Bosnia the international community 
attempted to establish a democracy right away, but it was soon clear that, so shortly after the civil war, 
distrust between politicians and civilians was a stronger emotion than the calling for cooperation. The 
alternative solution is authoritarianism, as in Rwanda. The downside of authoritarianism is that the 
repressed groups in society may try to emancipate themselves and an authoritarian state, be it slightly 
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democratic, is likely to oppose such a movement. They pose a threat to the ruling class, which may lead 
to violence in the future. 
When looking at the electoral institutions PR is no guarantee for inclusive politics, it is no safeguard that 
minorities will be represented in the national political institutions. This was especially clear in the case of 
Bosnia, where the drafting of the constitution was supervised by international actors (Dayton Agreement, 
1995). There was no repression when the party system was created in 1996, which ensured that the main 
ethnic groups all acquired representation, although this does not mean that everyone is represented. Those 
that were represented, however, were first and foremost former armed opposition forces that were 
rewarded for their violent behaviour in the civil war (Spears, 2010: 13; Manning, 2004: 54).  
In 2006 a Jewish and a Romanian Bosnian won an appeal at the European Court of Human Rights, 
claiming that the rules for the election of the presidency were discriminatory against minorities other than 
Bosniak, Serb or Croat (Freedomhouse, 2010a). Why did former radical acquire representation, where 
more moderate groups did not? 
The Rwandan case has shown that PR can be used as a way to legitimize otherwise unfree and 
uncompetitive democracy. In Rwanda the Hutu never were represented by their “own” party due to a 
limitation on political pluralism. The Hutu are a disadvantaged majority in Rwanda: they carry the guilt of 
the genocide and are dispersed demographically, while the Tutsi government is holding all political and 
military power (Minorities at Risk, 2006a). The Tutsi predominance will probably lead to a new eruption 
of the ethnic conflict in  Rwanda in the future. 
The downsides of PR have become more clear in the Bosnian case. Because Bosnian politicians were 
unable and unwilling to conduct consensual politics and pass necessary legislation, it became clear that 
critics of consociationalism have a point when they are pessimistic about the resolve of politicians in 
fragile democracies and failed states to find trade-offs between conflicting values (Norris, 2008: 111). 
The argument that PR may also give communities incentives for rivalry instead of cooperation, as can be 
observed in Bosnia (Norris, 2008: 110). In Rwanda power-sharing has given politician incentives for 
rivalry instead of cooperation. In the period leading up to the war, in both countries extremist politicians 
demonized people belonging to other ethnicities (ibid.). It made ethnic violence in both civil wars 
possible. 
Policy makers should be very careful with consociational engineering. The normative and empirical types 
of consociational theory are conceptually unclear, and PR is considering comparative research a good 
measure to attain peace, but not to establish democracy (Bogaards, 1998; Bogaards, 2013). My case 
studies generally support Bogaards’ claims that PR is a good institution to acquire peace, both cases 
stayed free from large outbursts of violence (Boogaarts, 2013). The latter claim is also true for both cases. 
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Both cases have not become strong democratic polities: Rwanda is classified as an authoritarian 
democracy and Bosnia an electoral democracy by Freedomhouse (2008a, 2010b). 
Rwanda is probably not a favourable case for PR or any form of consociational democracy (Lijphart, 
2008). African countries are rarely federal and have weak institutions, and armed conflicts are often 
extreme. This raises all kinds of barriers for political leaders in Africa to opt against power-sharing (Spear, 
2010). Despite a huge amount of distrust between Hutu and Tutsi, Stroh argues that there is a sound base 
for establishing overarching loyalties between both groups, because they have a shared language and 
culture (Stroh, 2009: 12). Bosnia is a much more favourable case as ethnic conflict is much more 
institutionalized then in Rwanda. The ethnic divide is accompanied by strong feelings of nationalism, 
interests (like centralization versus de-centralization) are ethnically based and there is large overlap 
between religious denominations and the ethnic divide. Such a society is much better suited to 
consociational institutions among other factors.  
 
8. Conclusion  
The research design and research topic have some serious limitations, which need to be elaborated on 
further. In the final thesis the conclusion cannot be formulated in strong statements of causality or 
correlation. The fact that I have adopted a comparative study of two cases will make it difficult to 
generalize the findings of this research. Even though making the comparison between those cases is very 
useful in dissecting some of the events that have led to the de-escalation of ethnic violence in Bosnia and 
Rwanda. Certainly some of these events will be similar or comparable. The main contribution of this 
thesis will be in scientific debate on electoral institutions and their effect on the de-escalation of ethnic 
conflict. In Bosnia the adoption of consociationalism has proven useful to mitigate some of the very 
violent tendencies these ethnic groups showed towards each other. It has promoted group representation 
and minority veto’s, to make sure the three big ethnic groups have their say in the political affairs of the 
country.  
Rwanda offers another perspective on the institutional debate. Although due to external pressures 
consociational institutions were adopted, ethnic violence on a large scale was not prevented. In the post-
conflict situation a predominant party arose and consociational institutions were abolished in effect. If 
political affairs in Rwanda are explored more thoroughly, it will be possible to draw inference on how 
these new political norms have served Rwandese politics and the coexistence of ethnic groups. The 
comparison between Rwanda and Bosnia is important because we can delve into and compare the 
conditions for success of the Consociational Theory. With the criticisms expressed in the literature in 
mind, I shall review the electoral institutions and their influence on the post-conflict situation. 
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Another limitation of the comparative case study adopted in this research is that we cannot ignore the 
possibility that the circumstances which influenced the de-escalation of ethnic conflict were case specific. 
Perhaps consociational theory can only explain the de-escalation in part at best. Therefore it is of vital 
importance that all possible explanations are incorporated. A high degree of uncertainty is inherent in this 
field of research. Realizing this is an important step in making a clear argument. This research should be 
judged on its merits, supplying case specific evidence to the debate in the literature and broadening our 
understanding of it. 
In this comparison the limitations of consociational theory are observed. First of all, the political 
relevance of social identities. Carla Schralm has shown in her comparative study that the political 
relevance of social identities in Rwanda and Burundi is quite limited (2014: 626-627). Horowitz also 
observes that these identities can change over time. In this research the policy of Banjarwanda, 
implementing a Rwandan identity, by the current Rwandan government shows that it attempts to de-
institutionalize ethnicity from Rwandan society (Reyntjens, 2007: 1109-1111). In Bosnia Bosniaks 
reacted to Serbian and Croatian nationalism in Bosnia by creating their own national identity, while they 
were only a religious group before, they are now a force to be reckoned with in Bosnian politics 
(Robinson et al., 2001: 960). Power-sharing and consociationalism have been criticized before for 
assuming the rigidness of social identities (Norris, 2008: 108-109). 
It is sometimes very questionable if power-sharing has led to incentives to cooperate. In Bosnia the main 
reason why democracy has survived is that the OHR could pass legislation and remove politicians that 
frustrated the implementation of the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia (Chandler, 2006: 340). 
Because of the so called Bonn-powers it did not matter if Bosnian federal politics were deadlocked and 
governments did not stay in power for a prolonged period of time (Freedomhouse, 2010a). In Rwanda 
there was no incentive to cooperate whatsoever. As Reyntjens has argued, political pluralism in Rwanda 
is even more limited than before the elections of 2003, and other civil liberties were lacking as well (2007: 
1109). This all made political opposition very hard. Spears has argued that the degree of commitment 
required to employ in power-sharing and inclusive politics is very unlikely in Africa (Spears, 2010: 11). 
These conclusions about Rwanda and Bosnia were already recognized by Norris (2008: 110).  
The last point Norris makes on the critique of consociational democracy is already somewhat covered by 
these previous considerations. Fragile democracies may be less equipped to cope with the trade-off of 
values required in consociational democracies. Observing Rwanda and Bosnia has shown that both 
countries did not really manage to meet these criteria. In Rwanda, like Spears argued, leaders were very 
reluctant to share power, as political conduct is based more on realist conceptions of bargaining. Zero-
sum games, everything I give you I lose, are more important in countries with weak central institutions 
(2010: 11). These considerations may also hold for Bosnia, where leaders of ethnic political parties would 
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rather serve their group’s interests than cooperate for the greater good (Belloni, 2001: 166; Bahtic-
Kunrath, 2011: 913). 
We can conclude that both Bosnia and Rwanda do not meet all or a substantial number of the criteria 
Lijphart and Norris present for power-sharing, and a detailed description of those cases shows the 
limitations of the consociational democracy. This is the case in Rwanda to a larger extent than in Bosnia. 
Despite the differences, it is a reassuring thought that Bosnia and Rwanda have remained peaceful over 
twenty years, despite their extremely violent period in the 1990s, which were so extreme that they 
reminded politicians of the Second World War. This has sparked an immense commitment in Bosnia to 
make power-sharing work. In Rwanda, however, such an effort probably would not have worked, which 
is supported by the course of the Arusha negotiations. The mayor difference between  the processes which 
took place on the route to peace, was that Bosnia was mostly governed by external forces, forcing their 
system onto the Bosnian government, while in the Rwandan case the external forces had more of a 
guiding role, which clearly signifies how different these two countries and their peace processes were. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Composition of the Bosnian Parliament (1996-2010)
1,2. 
  
 
Year 1996 1998 2000 2002 2006 2010 
Ethnicity Party 
      Serbian SDS 9 4 6 5 3 4 
 
SRS 
 
3 
 
1 
  
 
SLOGA 
 
4 
    
 
PDP 
  
2 2 1 1 
 
SNSD 
   
3 7 8 
 
SPRS 
   
1 
  
 
DNS 
    
1 1 
Bosniak SDA 19 
 
8 10 9 7 
 
SBiH 2 
 
5 6 8 2 
 
KCD 
 
17 
    
 
BPS 
    
1 
 Croat HDZ 8 6 5 5 3 3 
 
NHI 
 
1 1 1 
  
 
HDU 
   
1 
  
 
HDZ 1990 
    
2 2 
Independent SDP 
 
4 9 4 5 8 
 
SD BiH 
 
2 
    
 
NSSM 2 
     
 
Joint-list 2 
     
 
DNZ 
 
1 1 1 1 1 
 
SP-U BiH 
  
1 1 
  
 
BOSS 
   
1 
  
 
NSRzB 
    
1 1 
 
SSB BiH 
     
4 
 
Other 
  
4 
   Total 
 
42 42 42 42 42 42 
 
1) Bosnian parliamentary election results: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2039_arc.htm 
2) Classification of ethnic and non-ethnic Bosnian parties: 
http://polisci.columbia.edu/files/polisci/content/pdf/students/McClelland_thnic%20Voters%20and
%20Non-Ethnic%20Parties.pdf 
 
 
